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ABSTRACT
A GAME MODELING OF A CLOSED-LOOP SUPPLY CHAIN IN A
WATER-ENERGY NEXUS: TECHNOLOGY ADVANCEMENT, MARKET
COMPETITION AND CAPACITY LIMIT
by
Nabeel Hamoud
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2019
Under the Supervision of Professor Jaejin Jang
Water and energy are two scarce and concerning resources interconnected in the water-energy
nexus. In the nexus, production of energy needs water, and production of water needs energy.
For better management of these resources in the nexus, this research considers a supply chain
that consists of water suppliers, power suppliers, and consumers of these commodities. In the
chain, water suppliers purchase power from power suppliers, and power suppliers purchase
water from water suppliers. Other consumers can also buy these resources at the water
and power markets. Each firm tries to maximize its own profit. The suppliers of water
and power decide their production quantities. The prices of the commodities depend on the
quantities supplied to the market, observing that a firm’s profit is dependent not only on its
own decision, but also on the decision of the other firms for their production quantities. The
interaction of the firms in the supply chain is modeled as a simultaneous game.
ii
Four different market structures (i.e., models) are introduced in this research. The first model
considers a monopoly power market and and a monopoly water market. In this model, we
find the Nash equilibrium and analyse various economic measures. We also investigate the
effect of technology efficiency on the same market as well as on the cross market. In the
second model, we consider a duopoly in the water market, where the two firms are identical.
The purpose of this model is to investigate the effect of market competition on the firms
of the same industry and the firms of the cross industry. The third model generalizes the
second model by considering oligopoly markets with identical firms. Another assumption of
the above models, besides their being identical, is that the firms do not have capacity limits.
In the last model, we relax these assumptions and consider that power suppliers may own
more than one generating unit (i.e., power plant). A case study is considered with different
scenarios to investigate the effect of technology efficiency and capacity limits.
In these models, we find the Nash equilibria and derive various economic measures. The
analysis shows that there are unique Nash equilibria under some conditions and multiple
Nash equilibria under other conditions. When there are multiple equilibria, a government
can provide incentives so that the firms can choose a Pareto optimal decision for the benefit
of all entities involved. We find that depending on the conditions of the markets, technology
improvement does not always lead to better outputs and better economic measures. When
there are enough supplies for the firms and consumers to purchase, improvement of pro-
duction technology for reduced water and power consumption also improves all economic
measures of the supply chain, including social welfare. Under the same condition, higher
competitions in the water or energy industry also improve all economic measures. However,
when either the water or the power supply is solely consumed by the firms in the cross in-
dustry, the improvements of technology and higher competition can give negative effects on
iii
some measures. When an industry has a new entrant (competitor), the incumbent firms may
earn higher profits if the technology inefficiency remains above 60%. While more efficient
firms may have a competitive advantage to produce more, a limited capacity may shift this
competitive advantage to less efficient firms if they have higher capacity limits when demand
is high.
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In the last decades, there has been a growing concern about the availability of natural
resources around the world. Two of these natural resources are water and energy. Many
nations are under severe stress, especially for water, such as North and South Africa, and
South and Central Asia (see Figure 1.1). Heat waves and droughts are also impacting many
areas. In California, for example, the governor issued a Drought State of Emergency in
January of 2017 as the state faced the driest year in its history. The demand for water is
growing and it is projected to increase by 55% in 2050 compared with 2000 [1] (see Figure
1.2). Similarly, the demand for energy is also expected to increase from 500 Exajoules
(EJ) to nearly 900 EJ in 2050 [1]. Dependence on traditional energy sources (i.e., fossil
fuels) is expected to remain around 80% throughout 2050. The majority of the traditional
energy consumption comes from six emerging economies, BRIICS (i.e., Brazil, Russia, India,
Indonesia, China and South Africa) [1].
This rapid demand increase poses risk to our environment. According to the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2014), human activities have clear impacts on
climate change due to the emission of greenhouse gases (GHG) [2]. GHGs trap heat in the
atmosphere, causing a temperature increase. It is estimated that temperature increase will
be on average between 2.0 and 4.5 Celsius degrees [1]. According to the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2012), the GHG emission from energy
1
and industrial use is projected to double by 2050 compared to 1990. One of the main contrib-
utors of the GHGs is carbon dioxide (CO2), which comes mainly from producing traditional
energy sources such as coal, natural gas and oil. In 2015, 195 nations signed an agreement to
reduce their GHG emission, hoping to keep the average temperature from increasing more
than 1.5 Celsius degrees.
Figure 1.1: Renewable water resources per capita in 2010
Population growth and a rise in living standards are some factors of the increased demand
for water and energy [3]. It is projected that the world population will reach nearly 9 billion
in 2050 [1]. With a limited access to renewable sources of water and energy, these two
factors will only worsen the situation. It is expected that most of the population will live in
urbanized areas, which will increase the stress of water and energy in high density regions.
Furthermore, with the rapid advancement of technology, the demand for energy is expected
to increase. Population demography also plays a significant role in increasing the demand
2
Figure 1.2: Global water demand: baseline (2000) and 2050
for energy and water. As a result of the technological advancement and innovation, it is
expected that aging population will rise. In the OECD countries, it is expected that the
over 65-year-old population will represent one quarter of the population. In other countries
such as Africa, their younger populations will grow rapidly [1]. These demographic changes
will certainly impact water and energy security.
1.2 Water and Energy
Water is an important natural resource as the whole economy relies on it [4]. Many in-
dustries such as agriculture and energy rely on water. Water consumption varies among
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sectors. Agriculture, for example, is a water-intensive industry that accounts for 70% of
the water consumed worldwide [5]. Industrial use of water accounts for about 22% globally,
but increases among the OECD nations to around 60% [5]. With the increasing concerns
of water scarcity, several industries need to reexamine the impact of such a crisis on their
operations. One of these industries is power generation, which depends on water for their
cooling systems. It is estimated that the amount of freshwater withdrawn by this industry in
the U.S. accounts for 41% [6]. It is projected that the global water demand by power plants
will increase dramatically (i.e., by 140%) in 2050. Due to the importance of this industry, it
will be the focus of this paper.
On the other hand, energy is another important driver for the economy. In fact, energy
is a critical element of every industry. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
abstracts the importance of energy in one sentence [7]:
"More than 80 percent of the country’s energy infrastructure is owned by the
private sector, supplying fuels to the transportation industry, electricity to house-
holds and businesses, and other sources of energy that are integral to growth and
production across the nation,” states the DHS.
The primary energy sources are generally divided into two categories, traditional and renew-
able. Some energy sources are used for fuel production such as crude oil, which undergoes
further processing and refining to covert to gasoline. Some others are used directly for power
generation by burning the primary energy source. Biomass, depending on the source, can
also be converted to transportation fuel by processing feedstocks or can be converted to heat
by burning wood waste and municipal solid waste.
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Power generation is a water-intensive process after irrigation, with a water withdrawal share
of nearly 40% of the total water withdrawn. Most of the water used in power generation
comes from thermoelectric and hydroelectric power plants. According to OECD (2012), the
water demand for electricity generation will increase by 140% in 2050 [1]. There two types of
power plants, base-load and peak-load. Base-load power plants are intended to provide the
minimum power demand at a near constant rate. These power plants have longer lead-time
to adjust their power outputs. An example of base-load power plants is nuclear power plants.
In contrast, peak load power plants can adjust their outputs with shorter lead times to meet
power demand. An example of peak-load power plant is natural gas power plants.
In the thermoelectric power plants, water is used to heat and to cool the steam that drives
the generation turbines. There are three main cooling technologies, open-through, wet-
recirculating (or closed-loop) and dry cooling. In open-through cooling systems, water is
withdrawn in large quantities and used only once. Most of the water withdrawn is discharged
to the original water source, but with a higher temperature. In closed-loop cooling systems,
water recirculates and is cooled in cooling towers. The majority of the water is lost in the
cooling towers due to evaporation. Water is withdrawn to make up the amount of water
consumed during the cooling process. Dry cooling does not require water, but cooling the
system takes a longer time, which may affect production efficiency. A comprehensive list
of water withdrawal and consumption factors for different cooling technologies and different
types of fuels is shown in Appendix A [8].
Freshwater is the dominant water source among most industries. Power generation, in partic-
ular, is increasingly dependent on freshwater, especially with open-loop cooling technology.
Open-loop cooling systems withdraw a substantial amount of water and consume a fraction
5
of the water withdrawn. Due to the massive amount of water needed for these types of
systems, freshwater has become the prevailing water source. When water is abundant, the
cost of freshwater to power plants is negligible. However, when freshwater is scarce, power
plants tend to find costly alternatives. There are different types of water based on its salinity
level. Water salinity level can be determined by measuring the total dissolved solids (TDS)
in water. The unit that is commonly used for TDS is part per millions or milligrams per liter
(1 ppm = 1 mg/L). The following table shows different water types with their respective
salinity level ranges[9].
Table 1.1: Water type and salinity level
WATER TYPE SALINITY
Freshwater Less than 1,000 ppm
Slightly saline water From 1,000 ppm to 3,000 ppm
Moderately saline water From 3,000 ppm to 10,000 ppm
Highly saline water From 10,000 ppm to 35,000 ppm
Ocean water 35,000 ppm
Slightly and moderately saline water are sometimes referred to as brackish water. In general,
water can be categorized in terms of conventionality. A conventional water source includes
freshwater, and unconventional water sources include, but are not limited to, reclaimed or
recycled wastewater, saline water and gray water. These water sources require a substantial
amount of energy to collect, treat and deliver their effluents to the points of demand.
As shown above, the dependence of water plants and power plants is bidirectional: water
plants need energy and power plants need water. Such interdependence is known in the
literature as the water-energy nexus. In this research, we focus on the interconnection of
water plants and power plants. In the next section, we discuss the water-energy nexus in
6
more detail to better understand the relationships between the two industries.
1.3 Water-Energy Nexus (WEN)
In this section, we highlight some of the interactions between water and energy from the
perspective of the water source, that is, the use of water in the energy sector (i.e., water for
energy), and the use of energy in the water industry (i.e., energy for water).
1.3.1 Conventional Water Sources
Freshwater (surface or ground) is the most common source of water used in the energy sector.
Surface freshwater has been the dominant source of water in the power industry. Freshwater
represents 84% of the water withdrawn by power plants in the United States. Due to the
high rate of water withdrawal, it is feasible to locate power plants near the source of water
whenever possible. Groundwater use is less than freshwater use, but it is a major source in
some areas. For example, the Great Basin withdraws more than 50% of its water demand
from groundwater and Hawaii’s groundwater water consumption accounts for more than 50%
of its total water consumption by power plants [10].
In this type of water, energy is required for pumping the water from the water source to the
power plant and for discharging the water back to the source; however, the cost of energy
is minimal compared with other operating costs such as fuel costs. Groundwater is used
to a lesser extent due to the extra capital and operating cost needed for water extraction,
although it is considered the first alternative to surface freshwater.
1.3.2 Unconventional Water Sources
Freshwater is not always available, sometimes due to climate change or site topography, and
sometimes due to access restrictions or barriers. For example, water rights in California are
based on “first in time, first in right” rule, which means that those who obtained water rights
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sooner have a higher priority for using water. There are different alternatives to freshwater,
but they usually bear additional costs. According to Harto et al. (2014), 18 percent of
all power generators in the US use unconventional water sources [11]. In the following, we
discuss these alternatives.
1.3.2.1 Reclaimed or Recycled Wastewater
Reclaimed wastewater is commonly referred to the water received by municipality districts
and treated for reuse. When wastewater is not contaminated with feces, it is called grey or
gray water. Examples of gray water in residential areas are shower and kitchen discharges.
Irrigation and industrial discharges are other great sources of grey water, which are usu-
ally chemically contaminated. The level of treatment depends on the purpose of using the
treated water, whether industrial, irrigation or human consumption. Some studies show that
wastewater can be treated to the quality level of potable water [? ? ].
However, the quality of the reclaimed water for non-human consumption is acceptable. Re-
claimed water for cooling purposes has been widely used in the last decade, especially in states
where heat waves and droughts are impacting water availability. For example, Florida, Cal-
ifornia and Texas have 17, 13 and 7 reclaimed-water-dependent power plants as of 2007 [12].
Recycled water is used to make up the water lost during the cooling process. Researchers
claim that reclaimed water is feasible only for the closed-loop cooling technology [13–15].
The energy use of wastewater treatment is much higher than freshwater treatment. Power
is needed for pumping, delivering and treating wastewater as well as for distributing treated
water to the points of demand. It must be noted that wastewater treatment plants can also
produce byproducts from biosolids such as fertilizers and biomass energy by converting the
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methane emitted by biosolids into biofuel [16]. For example, East Bay Municipal Utility
District is the leader in this area, producing more than their demand for energy. The excess
of energy is sold to the power grid [17]. In Wisconsin, Madison Metropolitan Sewerage
District satisfies 30 percent of its energy demand by producing methane [18].
1.3.2.2 Saline Water and Desalinated Water
As mentioned earlier, saline water includes brackish water (i.e., low to moderate salinity)
and sea and ocean water (i.e., high salinity). Saline water can be treated and transformed
to freshwater by desalination. Desalination is the process of removing the dissolved solids or
salts from the liquid. The quality standard of desalinated water depends on the purpose of
using the water. For example, the quality standard of potable water is very high with a TDS
of less than 50 ppm, while irrigation can tolerate low and to some extent moderate salinity.
There are different techniques of water desalination. The most common techniques used are
reverse osmosis (RO) and multistage flash (MSF). RO uses a couple of membranes to pass the
saline water through until reaching a satisfactory TDS level, while MSF simulates the natural
water cycle by heating the water and condensing the vapor. Desalination is commonly used
in locations where access to freshwater is limited and saline water is abundant.
In power generation, there are two ways that saline water can be used for cooling the steam
[11]. One way is that saline water can be used without altering its quality. This approach
requires special cooling towers (i.e., saline cooling towers), which are more impervious to the
higher salinity level. The downside of this cooling tower type is efficiency. Saline cooling
towers are less efficient than the freshwater cooling towers. A larger capacity is required
to produce the same outputs of smaller freshwater cooling towers. The other approach is
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desalinating saline water and using traditional freshwater cooling towers.
Desalination is not the best alternative as it raises environmental concerns and dangers to
ecosystems. However, when access to freshwater is extremely limited, desalination becomes
a valuable alternative, as in the example of the Middle East and U.S. southwestern states,
especially for potable water. Beside the environmental concerns of water desalination, en-
ergy demand is another major concern. Desalination is one of the most energy-intensive
processes, which makes it the most expensive alternative. RO requires energy in the form of
electricity, while MSF requires heat to simulate the water cycle process. Due to technological
advancement in membrane efficiency, RO has been gaining more attention lately. MSF, on
the other hand, can be found in regions where energy sources and/or heat byproduct are




The area of water-energy nexus is very broad. Consequently, in this research, the scope
is limited to the interconnection between the water industry and a subset of the energy
industry, the power generation industry. Generally, there are two types of literature on the
water-energy nexus, qualitative and quantitative. The qualitative literature is not the focus
of this review, but it is important to highlight some of it to understand the importance of
the water-energy nexus area.
Harto et al. (2014) present some of the opportunities and challenges of using saline water in
power plants [11]. While freshwater is the dominant source of water, with 76% of the power
generators using freshwater, approximately 7% of the currently operating facilities use saline
water as their cooling source. In addition, 6% of the power generators use brackish water
and 5% use reclaimed water [11]. A study highlights the lack of power plant water use data
and the absence of water use regulations in many U.S. states [19]. Another study reviews the
impact of water availability and cooling system options on the UK’s future water demand
and environmental policies [20]. Stillwell (2015) assesses the sustainability of the recent
water-energy nexus policies introduced by the U.S. Congress [21].
Scenario analysis of the water-energy nexus is one of the areas receiving much attention in the
research community. In this area, data for the current state are gathered and projections are
made based on certain assumptions and conditions. Ackerman and Fisher (2013) developed
four scenarios of a long run electricity generation planning for the West Coast of the U.S.
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through year 2100 [22]. The model is tested for a range of water and carbon prices. The
authors conclude that it is feasible to reshape the power generation sector in the West Coast
by carbon pricing, but not with water pricing because it is believed that water prices should
be higher to show noticeable effects.
Liu et al. (2015) used GCAM-USA to estimate water withdrawals and consumption of the
U.S. power industry at the state level [23]. They modeled seven scenarios considering factors
such as fuel types and cooling technology mix. They show that shifting from open-loop
cooling to closed-loop cooling is favorable. They also find that strategies such as using
carbon capture storage (CCS) and nuclear are less favorable due to their intensive water
consumption rates. Another study investigates energy consumption of the water supply
systems in Brazil [24]. They examined the efficiency of the water supply systems in the five
geopolitical regions of Brazil and found that 30% of the energy is lost due to water loss and
that some regions would benefit more than others from energy and water efficiency strategies.
Schoonbaert (2012) examines the impact of the UK’s energy and water policies on future
water security. The scenarios developed are based on the number of approved and planned
thermoelectric power generation facilities. One of the author’s recommendations is to es-
tablish a water pricing mechanism to promote water conservation [25]. The Great Lakes
Commission (2011) investigates five different scenarios of the water use for thermoelectric
power generation in the Great Lakes Basin region. Water withdrawal is expected to increase
by 10% in the business-as-usual scenario, but it would decrease by 87% if open-loop cooling
systems were prohibited [26]. DeNooyer et al. (2016) study the impact of shifting fuels and
retrofitting cooling systems in power plants in Illinois. They find that shifting from coal to
natural gas reduces water withdrawal and consumption by 37% and 32%, respectively. They
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also find that shifting to closed-loop systems reduces water withdrawals by 96% at the cost
of increasing water consumption by nearly 58% [27].
Life cycle analysis (LCA) has been used widely for analyzing the water-energy nexus. LCA
is a quantitative tool that assesses and analyses the life of a product or facility from creation
to disposal and is widely used in the decision making area [28]. Li et al. (2012) investigate
the supply chain of the wind power generation in China, focusing on water consumption
and carbon emissions [29]. As China has become the largest wind power supplier, the
amount of CO2 emitted and water consumed upstream (i.e., during manufacturing) cannot
be overlooked. The study shows that although the water consumed and the carbon produced
during the life cycle of the wind turbines is significant, they are much less than the amount
of water used by conventional power generating technologies. Another study combines an
LCA and an input-output analysis (IOA) to investigate the water consumption and carbon
emissions of eight power generation technologies in China. They show that shifting power
generation sources from carbon intensive energy sources (e.g., coal) to low-carbon energy
sources (e.g., wind) reduces water consumption significantly [30]. Yang and Chen (2016)
develop an LCA model to analyze the energy consumed for water extraction and treatment.
They also develop a network-environ-analysis (NEA) model to identify the elements of the
network and highlight the relationships between water and energy [31].
Wong and Johnston (2013) investigate the possibility of replicating the cooling system design
of the Turkey Point power plant in five other power plants, taking into consideration factors
such as the type of soil and water availability [32]. The cooling system of the Turkey Point
power plant is unique, with an area of 6000 acres with multiple canals in a closed system.
This system is proven to make the power plant self-sufficient, where water loss is much less
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than the other systems as a result of being less susceptible to evaporation. The results
show that such replication is feasible, especially in areas where using the traditional cooling
systems is not feasible. The integration of wind power and brackish groundwater for the
operation of a desalination plant in the state of Texas is also investigated [33]. The authors
estimate the energy requirement of the desalination plant and then perform an economic
and a geographic analysis to investigate the feasibility of the integration. They find that
in some municipalities it is profitable to integrate wind power and brackish ground water
desalination. Barker and Stillwell (2016) also perform an economic analysis of an engineered
water reuse by power plants and compare it with the de facto water reuse [34]. They find that
the engineered water reuse improves reliability and performance at the cost of infrastructure
capital cost. Sovacool and Sovacool (2009) study the trade-off between water and electricity
using the estimated data of population, water demand and planned available power plant
capacity [35].
Gabriel et al. (2016) optimize the use of excess heat produced by industrial processes. Some
of the heat recovered from industrial processes is converted to energy for water desalination,
water cooling, and power generation [36]. Martin and Grossmann (2015) develop a sequential
optimization problem, where they first optimize the system’s design that includes biofuel
production and other renewable energy sources such as concentrated solar power and wind
power and then minimize the total cost of the water network. They find that FT-fuels are
more efficient than the other energy sources [37]. Another study investigates the use of
renewable energy sources for the desalination of brackish ground water in Texas [38]. In
the first step, the power needed for the water treatment is estimated. Second, the size of
the energy source or a combination of energy sources is estimated. Finally, an optimization
model is developed to find the optimal operational schedule that maximizes profit. Stillwell
14
and Webber (2014) study the feasibility of using reclaimed water for cooling purposes in
thermoelectric power plants in Texas [13]. They show that 62 of the power plants are
matched with single wastewater treatment plants for a reclaimed water supply, 30 power
plants have multiple optima within 25 miles, and 33 power plants have no feasible solutions.
Santhosh et al. (2014) develop a nonlinear programming problem to optimize the economic
dispatch of water and power [39]. The model considers a power plant, a water plant and
a co-production plant. The model also considers water and power storage. They show
that storage facilities reduce the total cost and improve reliability. Zhang and Vesselinov
(2016) address a water-energy nexus planning problem, where they solve a bi-level linear
programming problem using a fuzzy approach considering the type of water, the type of
fuel, GHG emission, and expansion of power plants [40].
Game theory is the study of the behaviors of individuals or firms when their payoffs depend
not only on their own actions, but also on the actions of their rivals [41]. The central feature
of this study area is the prediction of a game’s outcomes based on the beliefs of players
toward each other. In the area of the water-energy nexus, there is not much attention paid
to analyzing the interactions between the entities of the nexus as a game model. In a study
focused on a shale gas production supply chain, the authors model a leader-follower game,
where two power plants act as leaders and a shale gas producer acts as a follower. The
power plants decide their gas demand and the shale gas producer decides the amount of gas
to extract from various wells to maximize its own profit and minimize water consumption
[42]. Another study investigates a water and power sharing problem between two countries,
Ghana and Burkina Faso. The upstream country (leader) make a decision of the amount
of water to consume, and the downstream country (follower) observes and make a decision
of the amount of power to share with the leader. The conflict is solved if the two countries
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cooperate and self-enforce their agreements [43]. Madani studies the cause of delay of reli-
censing hydropower plants. Part of the relicensing process is reaching an agreement between
hydropower plant operators and other interest groups including environmentalists [44]. The
author studies this stage by formulating a bargaining game between the hydropower oper-
ators and interest groups. The hydropower operator wants to maximize his profit and the
interest groups want to maximize their utilities. Other studies investigated the interaction
between water, power and carbon markets considering power plants as the players of the
game [45, 46]. Water is modeled as a cost factor in the objective function of the power
plants, as tax. The authors proposed a reinforcement learning approach to find the equilib-
rium. None of the studies discussed above and to the best of our knowledge, no one modeled
the water suppliers as decision makers in a water-energy nexus game, In this research, we
model the interaction between water plants and power plants, where they both decide the
quantity to produce. The firms sell their output to their respected markets, and buy the
inputs from the cross-market.
Contribution summary
• Consideration of both water and power markets in a closed-loop water-energy nexus.
• Modeling the firms in the water market as decision makers.
• Modeling the closed-loop supply chain as a game between the firms.





Different types of power plants have different water use intensity. Thermal power plants
(e.g., fossil fuel, geothermal and nuclear power plants) are examples of the water-intensive
power plants. Renewable energy sources such as wind and solar use water only minimally,
mostly for cleaning purposes. Power plants can use other than freshwater for their cooling
systems. Harto et al. (2014) present some of the opportunities and challenges of using
saline water for power plant cooling [11]. Different cooling technologies have different water
consumption and withdrawal rates (see appendix A) [6]. One the other hand, there are
also different types of water plants such as desalination plants, wastewater treatment plants
and freshwater suppliers. Their power consumption varies depending on the treatment level,
distance and elevation of the water source. The majority of the power consumed by water
plants is for water treatment, pumping and delivery.
3.1 Power Markets
In many regions, power suppliers and power consumers participate in a regional market coor-
dinated by an Independent System Operator (ISO) or a Regional Transmission Organization
(RTO). A power supplier may own one or more power generation units. Currently, there
are ten ISOs/RTOs in North America [47]. These ISOs/RTOs receive offers (bids) from the
power suppliers (consumers) for their power supply (demand). The operators dispatch power
plants after matching supply and demand and determine the market clearing price. They
also ensure reliability of the transmission system. In this study, we consider an ISO/RTO as
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Figure 3.1: ISOs/RTOs in North America
a power market with the exception of the auction process.
3.2 Water Markets
While water is the most demanded commodity, it is believed it is under-valued [22, 48].
Water marketing is a promising tool to drive water to where it is needed the most [49].
Currently, there are a few water markets. Their structures are different from those of the
power markets. In the U.S., water has been traded in the form of water rights. There are two
types of water rights: prior-appropriation rights (popular in the West Coast) and riparian
rights (popular in the East Coast). A water right gives its holder the right to withdraw a
specified amount of water from a specific stream . The water right holders can also trade
some/all of their rights to other users. In California, water rights can be leased for short
term, long term or sold permanently (see Figure 3.2). Australia has a more sophisticated
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Figure 3.2: Water trades in California
water market that follows a cap-and-trade mechanism. The government allocates quotas to
water users, and they trade water online at the market price [50]. In this research, the water
market is assumed to be centralized and driven by supply and demand. The price of water is
for the delivered product, meaning that it includes any additional cost that may be incurred,
such as transportation and pumping cots.
3.3 Water-Energy Nexus Structures
In this study, we consider a supply chain of power and water along with their interrelation-
ship (water-energy nexus); power suppliers purchase water from the water market and sell
power at the power market, and water suppliers buy power from the power market and sell
water at the water market. At both markets, the prices are determined by the quantity
produced. All firms want to maximize their own profits by deciding their respective produc-
tion quantity. The power suppliers and water suppliers make their decisions independently
and simultaneously. The dilemma these firms face is how much to produce to maximize
their own profits because the profit of each firm depends not only on its own decision, but
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also on other firms’ decisions via the prices of the water and energy at the markets. We
model the interaction between the power suppliers and water suppliers as a simultaneous
non-cooperative game with complete information.
In this research, we consider three different market structures (models) of the supply chain
and analytically find the Nash equilibrium. In the first model, we have one power supplier
and one water supplier, each serving its own market as a monopolist. In the model, we
discuss the possible decisions that the firms may make and how their decisions affect the
profits of the firms, the consumer surplus and social welfare. We also study the effect of
technology improvement on the aforementioned economic measures. In the second model,
we study the effect of Cournot competition in the supply chain; we consider a duopoly in the
water market and a monopoly in the power market. In the third model, we generalize the
model with oligopoly markets of power and water and investigate the impact of increased
competition. The above models consider identical firms when there is competition and
assume no capacity limits. In the last model, we relax these assumptions and apply the
model on the PJM power market.
To have our analysis be more focused on the main objectives of the research, we consider only
direct costs, which are consolidated in the cost of acquiring the cross-industry commodity.
For example, the only cost the water supplier bears is the cost of the electricity needed to
treat and deliver the water. Although a power supplier or water supplier may own multiple
plants, we focus only on the collective output from each firm.
The convention of the notation given in Table 3.1 is that the parameters of the power price
and water price are annotated with upper-case letters and lower-case letters, respectively.
To distinguish the decision variables of the three models, we assign superscripts. The first
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value represents the model number followed by a case number (e.g., q1,1). At the markets,
the prices of power and water have a linear relationship with the amounts of the commodities
supplied to the markets.
Table 3.1: Notation
Parameters
A Reservation price of electricity $/MWh
B Unit price of electricity $/MWh2
a Reservation price of water $/103 gallons
b Unit price of water $/103 gallons2
ε Average power generation factor of water suppliers MWh/103 gallons
ψ Average water use factor of power suppliers 103 gallons/MWh
Decision variables
q Quantity of power produced and sold in the market
w Quantity of water produced and sold in the market
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CHAPTER 4:
MODEL I: ONE POWER SUPPLIER AND ONE
WATER SUPPLIER
4.1 Introduction
In this model, we consider a single power supplier in the power industry and a single wa-
ter supplier in the water industry (Figure 4.1). A classic example is a regulated market.
Although many countries and states moved toward deregulation, especially for the power
industry, market regulations are still dominant in many countries and some states. For
example, the power market and water market in Saudi Arabia are dominated by the Saudi
Electric Company (SEC) and the National Water Company (NWC), respectively. In Nevada,
NVEnergy has been a monopolist power supplier until recently.
The water supplier (WS) and the power supplier (PS) produce and sell their outputs to their
respected markets, and they also buy their input resources from the markets for production.
The markets are also accessed by other power and water users, retailers, or just consumers
hereafter. The parameter, ψ, refers to the water use factor of power plants, which can be
associated with water consumption or water withdrawal, even in which case water cannot be
reused without the treatment by the water supplier. The price of electricity is determined by
the inverse linear demand function depending on the amount of electricity provided to the
market, P p = A−Bq. The price of water is determined similarly, Pw = a−bw. The demand
of these commodities reflects the demand of consumers as well as the not-yet determined
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additional demand of the cross-industry firm. The power supplier and the water supplier can
buy water and electricity only up to the quantities available in the markets. Both suppliers
want to maximize their own profits by choosing their output quantities, q and w.
Figure 4.1: Water-energy nexus of Model I (PS: Power Supplier, WS: Water
Supplier)
The problem of the power supplier is as follows:
max
q
(A−Bq) q − (a− bw)ψq
s.t. ψq ≤ w (λ1)
q ≥ 0
(4.1)
The problem of the water supplier is as follows:
max
w
(a− bw)w − (A−Bq) εw




Here, ψq is the amount of water needed by the power supplier to produce q units of electricity,
and εw is the amount of electricity needed by the water supplier to produce w units of
water. Because the objective functions are concave and the constraints are linear, any
local maximizers are global maximizers of the problem. We can determine the equilibrium
quantities of electricity and water that the suppliers would produce by solving these two
problems simultaneously.
4.2 Solution Approach
The Nash equilibria of this supply chain can be found by using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
(KKT) conditions [51].
Lagrangian functions of problems (4.1) and (4.2) are:
L1 (q, λ1) = (A−Bq) q − (a− bw)ψq − λ1 (ψq − w)
L2 (w, λ2) = (a− bw)w − (A−Bq) εw − λ2 (εw − q)
and the KKT conditions are:
0 ≤ q ⊥ A− 2Bq − (a− bw)ψ − ψλ1 ≤ 0
0 ≤ w ⊥ a− 2bw − (A−Bq) ε− ελ2 ≤ 0
0 ≤ λ1 ⊥ ψq − w ≤ 0
0 ≤ λ2 ⊥ εw − q ≤ 0
The variables, λ1 and λ2, are the shadow prices of the constraints in (4.1) and (4.2), respec-




Since the problems have two decision variables and two dual variables, there could be a
combination of 16 possible cases to consider for non-negativity of the variables. Since the
two suppliers depend on each other for their inputs, it is not possible for one firm to produce
any quantity when the other firm does not. Also, we consider the cases that produce positive
outputs only. This reduces the non-trivial cases to four cases. In the first case, the dual
variables are set equal to zero (λ1 = 0 and λ2 = 0). In the second and third cases, one of the
dual variables is set to zero and the other is positive. In the fourth case, both dual variables
are set to positive; in this case, one of the firms produces a negative profit as discussed in
the next paragraph.
The technology efficiencies play a significant role in this supply chain. We call the product
of the terms ψ and ε the overall inefficiency factor. The higher the value of ψε, the less
efficient the supply chain is. When ψε = 1, the total output of one firm is equal to the input
of the other firm. Thus, no consumer of either market buys either water or power. The
game between the firms when ψε = 1 becomes a zero-sum game, where the gain of one firm
is equal to the loss of the other firm (πP = −πW ). If ψε > 1, the system is not sustainable;
that is, a certain quantity of output of one firm is not sufficient to feed the other firm to
produce enough quantity to support back the original output amount of the first firm.
The remainder of this paper considers only the cases with ψε < 1, the efficient cases. This
leaves us with three cases in which the outputs are positive and the firms generate profits.
In case I-1, either firm produces strictly more output than the demand of the other firm,
and the consumers buy both commodities. We call this case the normal case.
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Proposition 1. (Equilibrium of case I-1, normal case)
When there are one power supplier and one water supplier, and demand of water and power
is less than their supply, if
ψε < 1 and
ε ((2− εψ) εB + ψb)
((2− εψ) b+ ε2B)
≤ Aε
a










(2− εψ) a− Aε
(4− εψ) b
> 0




The consumers of both markets buy positive amount of water and electricity from the markets.
The proof is given in Appendix B.1.
The range of input parameters, or input conditions, for case I-1 is shown in Figure 4.2(a). In
this case, all economic measures such as profits of firms, consumer and producer surpluses
(i.e., the sum of profits as capital costs are ignored), and social welfare can be obtained from
these values and be shown to be strictly positive. Appendix B.4 summarizes the equilibrium
values of case I-1.
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Figure 4.2: Input conditions of Model I
Proposition 2. (Equilibrium of case I-2)
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= ψq1,2 > 0
and the dual variables,
λ1,21 =





The water output is bought entirely by the power supplier, and the water consumer does not
buy any water. The proof is given in Appendix B.2.
The input condition of case I-2 is shown in Figure 4.2(b). In the figure, the horizontal dashed
line divides case I-2 into two regions: A and B. From the derivative of the profit function of
the water supplier to get the marginal revenue and the marginal cost and using the binding
condition (w = ψq), we find a lower reservation cost of water than the reservation price of
water in region A. In other words, the marginal revenue curve cuts the decreasing marginal
cost curve from above in region A as shown in Figure 4.3 1. The opposite is true for region B.
In either of these two regions, the power supplier buys all water from the water supplier. All
the economic measures are shown in Appendix B.4. Beside the profit of the power supplier, it
can be easily inspected that the water supplier’s profit, the consumer surpluses of the power
and the water markets are all positive. The positivity of the profit of the power supplier can
be shown by solving the numerator for Aε/a after setting it at zero: we find that Aε/a is
greater than
ε((2−εψ)B+ψ2b)
((2−εψ)ψb+εB) (i.e. an input condition of case I-2).
1This case is similar to natural monopoly, which also has a decreasing marginal cost.
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Figure 4.3: Conditions of regions A (left) and B (right) of Case I-2
Proposition 3. (Equilibrium of case I-3)
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ε (2Bε− bψ)
> 0
The power output is bought entirely by the water supplier, and the power consumer does not
buy any power. The proof is given in Appendix B.3.
Since case I-3 is symmetric to case I-2, the discussion of case I-2 applies to case I-3. The
input conditions of the parameters are shown in Figure 4.2(c).
4.4 Pareto Optimal Equilibrium
The analysis shows that there can be a unique equilibrium or multiple equilibria, depending
on the input conditions (Figure 4.4). We observe a unique equilibrium when the marginal
revenue curve cuts the marginal cost from above (ψε < Aε/a < 1). On the other hand, as
can be seen in the figure, there are four regions of multiple equilibria. In the two regions
marked with 2A,3B and 3A,2B, one of the firms buys all the output of the cross-industry
firm and sells its output to its market. In the two other regions (1,2B and 1,3B), either both
firms sell to their customers or one of the firms sells solely to the cross-industry firm. If a
Pareto optimal equilibrium exists in these cases, the choice of firms will be more predictable.
In the former cases (2A,3B and 3A,2B), the customers would receive one commodity only,
either water or power. In the latter cases (1,2B and 1,3B), however, the customers would
receive both commodities, which we discuss and prove in the following because there is a
significant difference between the outcomes of the two equilibria in these cases.
Under an input condition with multiple equilibria, if one of them is from case 1 (normal
case), it can be shown that it is Pareto optimal. That is, the firms’ profits, the consumer
surpluses of the two markets and social welfare are higher in the normal case than in the other
cases. The proof is given in Appendix B.5. For more discussions on general multi-equilibria
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and Pareto optimality, refer to Church and Ware (2000) and LaValle (2006) [52, 53]. Some
degree of coordination helps the firms to achieve the Pareto optimal equilibrium, possibly via
a public agency or an independent market coordinator. Especially since the two suppliers
exist in different markets, vertical coordination is plausible without violating the anti-trust
laws.
Figure 4.4: Equilibrium domains of the water-energy nexus with monopoly
markets (the numbers are the case numbers of Model I)
4.5 Effect of Technology Improvement
People try hard to reduce water use for power generation and reduce power consumption
for water production. In this section, we study how the technology improvement affects the
supply chain equilibria.
In case I-1 (normal case), in which the consumers buy both water and power, the im-
provement of technology efficiency of a firm increases not only the output of its own in-
dustry (−∂q1,1/∂ψ > 0), but also that of the other industry (−∂w1,1/∂ψ > 0). For ex-
ample, improving the efficiency of the cooling system of the power supplier entices it to
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produce more power. The power increase reduces the market price that the water sup-
plier pays, which in turn increases the water output. The profits of these firms, the con-







P /∂ψ,−∂SW 1,1/∂ψ > 0 (Appendix B.6 shows
the values). Since the problem of the water supplier is symmetric to that of the power
supplier in case I-1, the same discussion holds for the power supplier in the case.
The impact of improved technology efficiency in cases I-2 (the power supplier buys all water
from the water supplier) is not as straightforward as it is in case I-1. In case I-2.A, where we
have a lower reservation cost of water than the reservation price, the efficiency improvement
of the power supplier (smaller ψ) or the water supplier (smaller ε) increases both the water
and power productions as well as the profit of the consumed water supplier. If a firm (or a
cross-industry firm) becomes more efficient, the marginal cost curve would shift (or rotate)
downward (see Figure 4.5). In return, the intersection occurs at a higher quantity. On the
other hand, if the marginal revenue curve cuts the marginal cost curve from below, lowering
the marginal cost would lead to an equilibrium at a lower quantity as in region B.
Figure 4.5: The effect of demand curve change for Case I-2.A
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The effect of improving technology efficiency on the unconsumed power supplier’s profit




























2 + 3bψε− 2b)
bψ (−5Bε2 + 4b)
Appendix B.6 shows also the effect of technology improvement on the economic measures of
case I-2.A. The effect on the economic measures of case I-2.B is the opposite of those of case
I-2.A. The results for case I-3 are symmetric to those of case I-2.
In summary, in the normal case (case I-1), the technology improvement helps all economic
measures. However, when one supplier uses all output of the other supplier (cases I-2 and
I-3), technology improvement improves the production of both commodities and the profit of
the consumed supplier, but it does not always improve the profit of the unconsumed supplier.




MODEL II: ONE POWER SUPPLIER AND TWO
WATER SUPPLIERS
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we extend the first model to account for competition in one industry. The
purpose is to study the effect of competition of firms on the equilibrium. In this model,
we assume the water market is a duopoly with two identical WS’s (Figure 5.1). The water
suppliers compete for quantity and aim to maximize their own profits. The power market is
still a monopoly with a major power supplier.
Figure 5.1: Water-energy nexus of Model II
The problems of the power supplier and the water suppliers are similar to that of Model I,




(A−Bq) q − (a− b(w1 + w2))ψq
s.t. ψq ≤ w1 + w2 (λ1)
q ≥ 0
(5.1)
And the profit-maximizing problem of the water suppliers are:
max
w1
(a− b (w1 + w2))w1 − (A−Bq) εw1 (5.2a)
s.t. w1 ≥ 0
max
w2
(a− b (w1 + w2))w2 − (A−Bq) εw2 (5.2b)
s.t. w2 ≥ 0
For both water suppliers, there is only one common constraint, that is, their power demand
does not exceed power supply.
ε(w1 + w2) ≤ q (λ2) (5.2c)
5.2 Solution Approach
Following the same approach of the previous model, we have the following Lagrangian func-
tions and KKT conditions:
The Lagrangian functions of (5.1) and (5.2) are:
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L1 (q, λ1) = (A−Bq) q − (a− b (w1 + w2))ψq − λ1 (ψq − (w1 + w2))
L2 (w1, λ2) = (a− b (w1 + w2))w1 − (A−Bq) εw1 − λ2 (ε (w1 + w2)− q)
L3 (w2, λ2) = (a− b (w1 + w2))w2 − (A−Bq) εw2 − λ2 (ε (w1 + w2)− q)
and the KKT conditions are:
0 ≤ q ⊥ A− 2Bq − (a− b (w1 + w2))ψ − ψλ1 ≤ 0
0 ≤ w1 ⊥ a− 2bw1 − bw2 − (A−Bq) ε− ελ2 ≤ 0
0 ≤ w2 ⊥ a− bw1 − 2bw2 − (A−Bq) ε− ελ2 ≤ 0
0 ≤ λ1 ⊥ ψq − (w1 + w2) ≤ 0
0 ≤ λ2 ⊥ ε (w1 + w2)− q ≤ 0
As in the first model, λ1 and λ2, are the shadow prices of water and power, respectively. The
conditions are reproduced in Appendix C in a different form for later derivations.
5.3 Equilibrium Analysis
In this model, we focus our attention on the effect of competition on the supply chain. Con-
sidering only the cases with positive outputs of the power supplier and the water suppliers,
we have these three cases discussed in Propositions 4, 5 and 6.
Proposition 4. (Equilibrium of case II-1, normal case)
When there are one power supplier and two identical water suppliers, and demand of water
and power is less than their supply, if
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ψε < 1and
ε (bψ + (2− εψ) 2Bε)




2 + (4− 2εψ)B)
2Bε+ (3− 2εψ) bψ
,




Aε− a (2− εψ)
2b (εψ − 3)
> 0
q2,1 =
aψ − A (3− 2εψ)
2B (εψ − 3)
> 0,




Both consumers buy water and power from the markets. The proof is given in Appendix C.1.
As shown in Appendix C.4, the profits of firms, consumer surplus and social welfare are all
positive.
Proposition 5. (Equilibrium of case II-2)
When there are one power supplier and two identical water suppliers, and water demand








ε (bψ2 + (4− 2εψ)B)















ε (bψ2 + (4− 2εψ)B)
2Bε+ (3− 2εψ) bψ
(caseII − 2.B) ,












and the dual variables,
λ2,21 =




The water output is bought entirely by the power supplier, and the other water consumers do
not buy any water. The proof is given in Appendix C.2.
In this case, the water suppliers use only ε (w1 + w2) MWh of the power produced, and the
remaining is bought by the consumers at the power market. Similar to case I-2, this case has
two regions, which depend on the parameters of the water and power prices. In either of the
regions, the power supplier’s output is restricted by the water available in the water market,
and every additional gallon of water produced contributes λ2,21 dollars to the power supplier’s
profit. Case II-3 is symmetric to case II-2, and the results are shown in Proposition 6. It
can be shown that the profits, consumer and producer surpluses and social welfare of cases
II-2 and II-3 are all positive. The values are shown in Appendix C.4.
Proposition 6. (Equilibrium of case II-3)
When there are one power supplier and two identical water suppliers, and power demand
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(2Bε2 + (3− 2εψ) b)
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< εψ, (caseII − 3.B) ,











and the dual variables,
λ2,31 = 0
λ2,32 = −
3Ab− 4Baε− abψ + 2ABε2 + 2Baε2ψ − 2Abεψ
2ε (2Bε− bψ)
> 0
The power output is bought entirely by the water supplier, and the consumers do not buy any
power. The proof is given in Appendix C.3.
The domain of the Equilibrium solutions of this model is similar to that of Model I (Figure
5.2).
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Figure 5.2: Equilibria domains of the water-energy nexus with Cournot com-
petition
5.4 Effect of Cournot Competition in Duopoly Markets
As compared with the results of model I, the newly introduced Cournot competition affects
the equilibria and economic measures.
Proposition 7. (Effect of Cournot competition on the equilibrium outputs, case
1)
The outputs of the supply chain when there is a Cournot competition in one industry are
always greater than those with monopoly firms in normal cases (cases I-1, II-1) when the
input conditions of both Propositions 1 and 4 are met.
Proof:
From Propositions 1 and 4, we get
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q2,1 − q1,1 = − ψ (Aε− a (2− εψ))
2B (ε2ψ2 − 7εψ + 12)
> 0
∑
w2,1 − w1,1 = − Aε− a (2− εψ)
b (ε2ψ2 − 7εψ + 12)
> 0,
Here, the denominators are positive since εψ < 1. The numerators are positive when Aε/a <
2 − εψ, which is always true from the positivity conditions of the equilibrium values (q and
w) of Propositions 1 and 4
Comparing cases I-1 and II-1 (normal cases), we find that competition in one market (e.g.,
water market) increases not only the output of its own market, but also the output of the
other market (e.g., power market). The increased output by the Cournot firms decreases the
price of Cournot commodity, which in turn, entices the firm in the other market to produce
more. In this case, the power supplier takes advantage of the reduced cost of water due to
the competition between the water suppliers and increases his production.
Proposition 8. (Effect of Cournot competition on the producer and consumer
surplus, case 1)
When production quantities are large enough to serve all customers in both markets in cases
I-1 (water monopoly) and II-1 (water duopoly), i.e., normal cases, and when both input
conditions of Propositions 1 and 4 are met:
• CS2,1p > CS1,1p , CS2,1w > CS1,1w
• PS2,1p > PS1,1p




The proofs are given in Appendices C.5-C.8.
In classic Cournot competitions, the total output produced by the firms increases with the
increased number of competitors; hence, the consumer surplus rises and the producer surplus
declines. However, it is not always the case in this supply chain. The third bullet of the
proposition shows that when the supply chain is less efficient (large εψ), all firms are better
off with Cournot competition. In such a case, a monopolist water supplier would be enticed
to split into two water suppliers and capture this surplus increase. On the other hand, if the
supply chain is more efficient (small εψ), the water suppliers may be induced to merge or form
a cartel to capture a higher profit. The producers and the consumers of the power industry
enjoy greater surpluses even though the competition takes place in the cross-industry, the
water industry in this case, because the power supplier’s cost decreases, allowing it to increase
production.
Different from the results of Proposition 8, which considers the normal cases with enough
outputs for the consumers in both markets, when one industry captures all the outputs of
the other industry, Cournot competition does not always lead to better outputs and welfare.
The following proposition shows the effect of water market competition on the total outputs
of the supply chain under this condition.
Proposition 9. (Effect of Cournot competition on the equilibrium outputs, pro-
ducer and consumer surplus and social welfare, case 2)
When the power industry consumes all water produced, the outputs of the supply chain,
producer surpluses, consumer surpluses and social welfare increase when there is competition
in the water market if Aε/a < 1, and they decrease otherwise if both input conditions of
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Propositions 2 and 5 are met.
Proof:
From Propositions 2 and 5,
q2,2 − q1,2 > 0 and
∑








Proposition 10. (Effect of Cournot competition on the equilibrium outputs, pro-
ducer and consumer surplus and social welfare, case 3)
When the water industry consumes all power produced (cases I-3 and II-3), the new com-
petition in the water market does not change the outputs, producer and consumer surpluses
and social welfare of the supply chain when both input conditions of Propositions 3 and 6 are
met.
Proof:
From Propositions 3 and 6,














2,3 = SW 1,3
The result is intuitive; if the demand of the water industry for power could not be met when
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there is only one water supplier, more water suppliers will not change the situation. As
shown above, all the economic measures remain unchanged with and without competition.
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CHAPTER 6:
MODEL III: MULTIPLE POWER SUPPLIERS AND
MULTIPLE WATER SUPPLIERS
6.1 Introduction
In this section, we generalize the conditions of the supply chain to include multiple power
suppliers and multiple water suppliers, as shown in Figure 6.1. In this model, the firms and
their products in the same industry are identical. They also compete for production quantity
and aim to maximize their own profits.
Figure 6.1: Water-energy nexus of Model III
Here, the prices of power and water are given by pp = A − B (q0 +
∑n
i qi) and p







, respectively. q0 and w0 represent the existing firms, and i and j represent
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the rival firms. Since all firms in the same industry are identical, we let pp = A−B (q0 + nq1)
and pw = a − b (w0 +mw1). There are n + 1 power suppliers and m + 1 water suppliers in
the supply chain. Since the rival firms are identical, we reformulate the problems as shown
in equation (6.1). Equation (6.1) represents the profit maximizing problem of the existing




(A−B (q0 + nq1)) q0 − (a− b (w0 +mw1))ψq0
s.t. ψ (q0 + nq1) ≤ (w0 +mw1) (λ1)
q0 ≥ 0
(6.1)
Similarly, we have the profit maximizing problem of the existing water supplier as follows:
max
w0
(a− b (w0 +mw1))w0 − (A−B (q0 + nq1)) εw0




The KKT conditions are used to solve this problem. The Lagrangian Functions of problems
(6.1) and (6.2) are:
L1 (q0, λ1) = (A−B (q0 + nq1)) q0 − (a− b (w0 +mw1))ψq0 − λ1 (ψ (q0 + nq1)− (w0 +mw1))
L2 (w0, λ2) = (a− b (w0 +mw1))w0 − (A−B (q0 + nq1)) εw0 − λ2 (ε (w0 +mw1)− (q0 + nq1)) ,
and the KKT conditions are:
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0 ≤ q0 ⊥ A− 2Bq0 −Bnq1 − (a− b (w0 +mw1))ψ − ψλ1 ≤ 0
0 ≤ w0 ⊥ a− 2bw0 − bmw1 − (A−B (q0 + nq1)) ε− ελ2 ≤ 0
0 ≤ λ1 ⊥ ψ (q0 + nq1)− (w0 +mw1) ≤ 0
0 ≤ λ2 ⊥ ε (w0 +mw1)− (q0 + nq1) ≤ 0
After defining the KKT conditions, we replace q1 and w1 with q0 and w0, respectively, and
proceed with the same solution procedure followed in Model I and Model II.
6.3 Equilibrium Analysis
Based on the above set of KKT conditions above, there can be 2(n+m+4) possible cases to
consider based on the positivity of the primal and dual variables. In this analysis, we consider
only the cases where the firms produce positive outputs and are profitable; which comes down
to three possible cases. Since all firms in their respected industry are identical, the analysis
is conducted for the existing firms.
Proposition 11. (Equilibrium of case III-1, normal case)
When there are n+ 1 power suppliers and m+ 1 water suppliers, and demand of water and
power is less than their supply, if
ε (2Bε+ bψ + 2Bεm+Bεn+ bnψ −Bε2ψ −Bε2mψ −Bε2nψ +Bεmn−Bε2mnψ)




ε (2B + 2Bm+Bn+ bψ2 −Bεψ +Bmn+ bnψ2 −Bεmψ −Bεnψ −Bεmnψ)
Bε+ 2bψ +Bεm+ bmψ + 2bnψ − bεψ2 + bmnψ − bεmψ2 − bεnψ2 − bεmnψ2
the following is a positive NE:
q3,10 =
−aψ + Am+ 2A− Aεψ − Aεmψ
B (2m+ 2n− εψ +mn− εmψ − εnψ − εmnψ + 4)
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w3,10 =
−Aε+ 2a+ an− aεψ − aεnψ
b (2m+ 2n− εψ +mn− εmψ − εnψ − εmnψ + 4)
At this NE, the firms produce enough output to meet the demand of the firms in the cross-
industry as well as the demand of the consumers in their respective industry. The economic
measures of cases III-1,2,3 are shown in Appendix D.1.
Proposition 12. (Equilibrium of case III-2)









ε (2B + 2Bm+Bn+ bψ2 −Bεψ +Bmn+ bnψ2 −Bεmψ −Bεnψ −Bεmnψ)
















ε (2B + 2Bm+Bn+ bψ2 −Bεψ +Bmn+ bnψ2 −Bεmψ −Bεnψ −Bεmnψ)
Bε+ 2bψ +Bεm+ bmψ + 2bnψ − bεψ2 + bmnψ − bεmψ2 − bεnψ2 − bεmnψ2
the following is a positive NE:
q3,20 =
(m+ 1) (Aε− a)
(n+ 1) (Bε− 2bψ +Bεm− bmψ)
w3,20 =
(Aε− a)ψ
Bε− 2bψ +Bεm− bmψ
,
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and the water market is entirely bought by the power suppliers.
The consumers of the water market, except for the power suppliers, do not buy any water. On
the other hand, the power industry produces more than the demand of the water suppliers.
In this case, there are two possible subcases depending on the values of the technology
efficiency and the conditions of the markets.
Proposition 13. (Equilibrium of case III-3)













ε (2Bε+ bψ + 2Bεm+Bεn+ bnψ −Bε2ψ −Bε2mψ −Bε2nψ +Bεmn−Bε2mnψ)








ε (2Bε+ bψ + 2Bεm+Bεn+ bnψ −Bε2ψ −Bε2mψ −Bε2nψ +Bεmn−Bε2mnψ)





the following is a positive NE:
q3,30 =
(A− aψ) ε
2Bε− bψ +Bεn− bnψ
w3,30 =
(n+ 1) (A− aψ)
(m+ 1) (2Bε− bψ +Bεn− bnψ)
,
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and the power market is entirely bought by the water suppliers.
This case is symmetric to case III-2. The water suppliers buy all power produced, while the
power suppliers buy some of the water produced and the rest of water is sold to the other
consumers. There are also two possible subcases in this case, depending on the values of the
reservation prices, technology efficiency and the elasticities of the demands.
Putting the three cases discussed above together, we see similar unique and multiple equi-
libria patterns as shown in models I and II, but the domain lines become straighter, and the





Nash equilibria occur when εψ < Aε/a < 1, that is, when the marginal revenue cuts the
marginal cost from above. On the other hand, we have four multiple equilibria: two in region
B of case III-2 and two in region B of case III-3. If any of the cases III-1, III-2A or III-3A
is one of the equilibria, that case is the Pareto optimal decision.
6.4 Effect of Cournot Competition in Oligopoly Markets
This section discusses the effect of increased competition on the domains of the input condi-
tions, the equilibrium outputs, the producer and consumer surpluses and the social welfare.
Figure 6.2 illustrates the input conditions of Model I (dashed) and Model III (solid). The
figure shows that, as the number of competitors in either of the two industries increases,
the thresholds that divide regions A and B of cases III-2 and III-3 approach 1. Also, the
x-intercept of the hyperbola curves approaches zero with more competitions. These effects
cause the hyperbola curves to be straighter and the types of domains of some regions to be
changed. For example, the case of the star-marked point in the figure is changed from case
I-2A (water consumers do not buy water) to case III-1 (all customers buy water and power).
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Figure 6.2: Effect of competition on the domains
In the rest of this section, we study the effect of competition on the NE outputs, profits,
consumer surplus and social welfare. We first discuss the effect of competition on case III-1
followed by case III-2.
Proposition 14. (Effect of Cournot competition on the equilibrium outputs, con-
sumer surplus and profits, case III-1, the normal case)
In a supply chain with multiple power suppliers and multiple water suppliers,
(a) More Cournot competition in one market increases not only the total output and con-














(b) More Cournot competition in one market decreases the individual outputs and profits
of the firms in the same market, but increases the individual outputs and profits of the
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The proofs are shown in Appendices D.2-D.6.
It is intuitive that the total output of a market is increased (a-i), the output of individual
firm is decreased (b-i) and profit of each firm is reduced (b-ii) when more competitors enter
that market. However, we observe that Cournot competition in one market leads to increased
output of the cross-market (a-ii). We also observe that, although the individual output is
reduced when more firms enter a market, the individual firms in the cross-market produce
more (b-iii) and earn higher profits (b-iv). It can be because the decreased price due to
competition makes the production of the firms in the cross-industry more efficient. The
consumers of both markets enjoy higher welfare when more firms enter either of the markets
(a-iii and a-iv).
Proposition 15. (Effect of Cournot competition on the producer surplus, case
III-1, normal case)
In a supply chain with multiple power suppliers and multiple water suppliers when the con-
sumers buy water and power, more Cournot competition in one market may increase or






< 0 iff εψ <
2n+ nm




< 0 iff εψ <
2m+ nm








From Proposition 15, the producer surplus of the entered market may increase or decrease
depending on the value of the overall efficiency of the supply chain and the number of firms
in the two markets. If there is at least one firm more in a market than in the cross-market
(i.e., n ≥ 1 +m), the right-hand sides of the conditions are larger than one and the producer
surplus always decreases with the increase of competition in that market because εψ < 1;
otherwise the producer surplus may increase or decrease.
The effect of the number of firms on the social welfare is complicated to present as an
equation. Thus, we show it graphically (Figure 6.3). Setting the derivative of the effect of
the number of firms on the social welfare to zero and solving for Aε/a, we obtain the curves
on the far right and far left of the figure. The figure shows the area where the social welfare
increases. Since the input conditions of case III-1 (i.e., the area between the solid lines)
fall in the shaded area, the social welfare always increases with competition in either of the
markets.
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Figure 6.3: The domain of increased social welfare with more power suppliers
in case III-1
In the following propositions, we show the effect of competition in case III-2, where all the
water is captured by the power suppliers.
Proposition 16. (Effect of Cournot competition on the total outputs, producer
and consumer surplus and social welfare, case III-2)
In a supply chain with multiple power suppliers and multiple water suppliers, when the power
industry buys all the water produced,
(a) Cournot competition in the industry that consumes all the outputs of the cross-industry
has no effect on the total output, the consumer surplus, the producer surplus or the






















(b) Cournot competition in the consumed industry can have a positive or negative effect on














































In the first part of Proposition 16, more firms in the power industry do not help or hurt the
water industry because the power industry is constrained by the water supply. The second
part of the proposition shows that competition in the water industry may have a positive
or negative impact on the economics measures. If marginal revenue cuts the marginal cost
from above (case III-2.A), the total outputs, consumer surpluses and producer surpluses of
both industries increase; but they decrease if the marginal revenue cuts the marginal cost
from below (case III-2.B).
Proposition 17. (Effect of Cournot competition on the individual outputs, case
III-2)
In a supply chain with multiple power suppliers and multiple water suppliers, when the power
industry buys all the water produced,
(a) The outputs of the individual power suppliers may increase or decrease with more com-




















The proofs are given in Appendices D.7 and D.8.
In case III-2, the increased competition in the water industry leads to different effects on
the output of each firm. For the power suppliers (the dominating industry), the individual
outputs increase in case III-2.A and decrease in case III-2.B. However, the effect of increasing
competition on the water suppliers is counterintuitive because competition decreases the
individual outputs of the competing firms. In this case, the outputs of the water suppliers
increase if Aε
a
< 1 and Bε
bψ
> 1 (Figure 6.4).




MODEL IV: MULTIPLE NON-IDENTICAL POWER
SUPPLIERS AND MULTIPLE NON-IDENTICAL
WATER SUPPLIERS
7.1 Introduction
In this model, there are multiple non-identical firms in each industry of the water-energy
supply chain. Some firms are more efficient than others due to the different technologies they
employ (see Figure 7.1). For example, some power plants use open-loop cooling systems that
have higher withdrawal, but lower consumption rate; while others use wet-cooling systems
that have lower withdrawal, but higher consumption rates. Also, these firms may have
different capacity constraints (physical constraint due to the size of the supplier or regulatory
constraints such as carbon emission caps).
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Figure 7.1: Water-energy nexus of Model IV
Since power suppliers may own more than one power generator with different energy sources,
they make their decision of the quantity to produce by each power generator, qik. The
objective of the power supplier is to maximize its own profit. The market price of electricity




k qik [54–56]. A and B represent
the reservation price of electricity and the unit price of power produced. We consider the cost
incurred in the short run, which is the cost of water acquisition. Power plants have capacity
limits equal to Qik, which can be physical (e.g., size of power generation unit) or regulatory






















s.t. qik ≤ Qik
(7.1)
In the water industry, the water suppliers also aim to maximize their own profits as well. The
revenues of the water suppliers incur by selling water to power suppliers and end consumers,
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and the cost is the cost of purchasing electricity from the power industry. There are three
types of water users, residential, agricultural, and commercial and industrial, and each user
prices water differently [57, 58]. That is because there are different factors that affect the price
of water. Worthington (2010) modeled the demand of water for commercial and industrial
users as a function of the cost of input resources (including water), its production quantity,
cost shares and other independent variables [57]. Another study modeled the water price for
industrial users as a function of its water consumption, entity size (based on the number of
employees) and the type of industry [58].
In this model, we assume that the water price follows the inverse demand function of water,
a − b
∑
wi, in which the parameter a incorporates all the factors except for the unit price
of water, b. The water price is affected by the total output of all firms. There are different
types of water suppliers based on the level and technology of water treatment, such as a
desalination plant and a wastewater treatment plant. In this model, a water supplier owns
one water treatment unit. Water suppliers also have capacity limits equal to Wj. The



















s.t. wj ≤ Wj
(7.2)
These two industries also have common constraints: the consumption of a commodity cannot



















Based on this model, we determine the equilibrium production quantities of electricity and
water and perform sensitivity analysis on some of the critical parameters.
7.2 Solution Approach
The water-energy nexus problem discussed above is an economic model that is classified
as an equilibrium problem. After transforming the problem to a set of KKT conditions as
shown below, it can be considered a complementarity problem [59], more specifically, a mixed
complementarity problem (MCP). MCP is a special case of the complementarity problems
that involves a mix of equalities and inequalities.
When the problem is small, it can be solved analytically and can produce a closed-form
solution by solving all possible combinations of primary and dual variables (see Hamoud and
Jang (2019), who analytically solved smaller problems of the water-energy nexus) [60]. How-
ever, when the number of variables and constraints increases, they become tedious to solve
analytically. Alternatively, commercial solutions such as GAMS with the help of specialized
MCP solvers such as NLPEC can solve such problems. Since the solution of KKT conditions
is necessary and sufficient, any solution of the above model is a Nash equilibrium (NE), and
no firm can gain by unilaterally deviating from the equilibrium. The KKT conditions of the
above problems are as follows:
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ψik − ψikλw − µpik ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ n
0 ≤ wj ⊥ a− 2bwj − b
m∑














p − µwj ≤ 0 ∀j ∈ m
0 ≤ µpik ⊥ qik −Qik ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ n
0 ≤ µwj ⊥ wj −Wj ≤ 0 ∀j ∈ m


















From the complementarity conditions, the variables qik and wj complement the first order
conditions, and the dual variables (µpik, µ
w
j , λ
p and λw) complement their respective primal
constraints. We use λ for the dual variables of the market constraints. Also, µpi and µwj are
the shadow prices of the capacity of the respective supplier. If the dual variable of an industry
is positive, that industry faces a shortage of inputs caused by the holdup of production by









Our example is motivated by the PJM market. PJM is a regional transmission operator that
coordinates the wholesale of power. Although PJM stands for Pennsylvania-New Jersey-
Maryland, it is now one of the world’s leading RTOs, connecting 13 states and the District
of Columbia and serving around 65 million people. There are different types of participants
in PJM, as shown in Figure 7.2. There are two types of companies who buy energy from
the market: metered buyers and unmetered buyers. Metered buyers consume the energy in
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the PJM market, while unmetered buyers consume it outside the market [61]. Market sellers
sell energy in the market, and load serving entities are the utility companies that provide
electricity to homes and businesses. A participating company can be one or a mix of the
above categories. Finally, a curtailment service provider is a company that limits demand
when needed.
In PJM, there are around 200 selling companies with subsidiaries that own one or more
power generators. According to data reported by EIA, about 25% of the sold power in the
first seven months of 2019 is generated by just 2% of the companies. Some of these major
companies are Duke Energy, Dominion Energy and Tennessee Valley Authority. They own
around 59, 66 and 73 power stations of different energy sources, respectively. Each power
station consists of one or more generation units.
Figure 7.2: PJM market participants
7.3.2 Numerical Example
Due to the lack of detailed data of the capacity limit and efficiency of the power generating
units, we develop a numerical example that simplifies the complexity of PJM, yet provides
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meaningful insights of the interaction between the firms in a closed-loop water-energy supply
chain. In this example, we introduce a duopoly power market and a monopoly water market.
These firms have some degree of market power (i.e., price makers) that their production level
affects the market price. Furthermore, to make our model computationally possible, the
power generating units of each firm are aggregated by their energy sources, e.g., all nuclear
power plants of a company are consolidated into one power plant. A number of scenarios
with different market conditions are introduced to examine their effects on the equilibrium
and other economic measures.
There are multiple factors to consider to determine the water usage of power suppliers. First,
the meaning of water usage. Water usage can be referred to water consumption or water
withdrawal of a power plant. Second, the technology used for the cooling system, open-loop,
recirculated or dry cooling. Third, the energy source of the power supplier. Appendix A
shows a combination of these factors with their corresponding consumption and withdrawal
rates.
The market price of power is assumed to follow the inverse demand function, P p = 50−0.02Q.
The slope is chosen arbitrarily, but it is within the range suggested by Chuang et. al. (2001)
[56]. Zhang and Vesselinov (2016) show different values of water (ranging from 1.78 to 4.37
$/103gal ) depending on the source of water (ground, surface or recycled) and the type of
power plants using the water [40]. Stillwell and Webber (2014) claim that reclaimed water
in Texas costs power plants from 0.98 to 2.45 $/103gal [13]. Some of the predominant power
plants enjoy lower long-term fixed rates. According to Griffin (2006), price elasticities of
water demands are different for different water use purposes [62]. For example, demand for
drinking water is less elastic than for others such as irrigation and industrial uses. The price
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intercept varies depending on the size of the market. In this study, we set the price intercept
and slope of water to 20 $/MWh and 0.008 $/MW 2h, respectively.
Energy use for water supply depends on the water source (surface or ground) and the type
and size of the water suppliers [63]. For example, surface freshwater suppliers may consume
energy for water pumping and delivery only, while wastewater treatment plants consume
additional energy for multi-stage treatments. In this study, we assume the water supplier
has an efficiency factor (ε) of 0.002 MWh/103gal.
7.3.2.1 Identical firms with unlimited capacity scenario (Benchmark)
The benchmark scenario assumes that power plants have the same water efficiency factor (ψ)
at the level of 0.47 103gal/MWh and have unlimited production capacity. This efficiency
factor represents the average water consumption by power plants in the regions covered by
PJM1. The solution shows that they produce an equal amount of output since the power
plants are identical in terms of their water consumption efficiency. The analysis shows that
there are two Nash equilibria. At one of them, the firms produce zero output, earning zero
profits and not contributing to social welfare. In the other equilibrium, each power supplier
produces a total amount of 774.5 MWh and the water supplier produces 935,000 gal. Since
the power plants have equal efficiency with unlimited capacity, there is indefinite number
of equilibria. The power suppliers can use any combination of power plants to generate the
same output. This second equilibrium is Pareto optimal since the firms and consumers are
better off in the second equilibrium [52, 53]. Since zero production equilibrium is unlikely to
be the case in reality, it is not discussed hereafter.
1Data of the average water consumption of power plants in the US are filtered for the states covered by
PJM. It must be noted that 0.47 is approximate since PJM may not cover a state entirely.
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Table 7.1: Economic measures of the benchmark scenario
W Q PSw Πp1 Πp2 PSp CSw CSp SW
935 1549 6996 11995 11995 23990 3498 23990 58473
7.3.2.2 Non-identical firms with unlimited capacity scenario (NIUL)
In this scenario, we assume power plants have different efficiency factors, but still have
unlimited production capacity. As discussed above, PJM’s participants may own multiple
power plants with different energy sources. In this scenario, we assume that there are three
types of power plants, nuclear, coal and natural gas. From Table 3, we arbitrarily pick an
efficiency factor for each power plant based on its energy source, as shown in Table 2. The
average efficiency of this power plant mix is 0.54 103gal/MWh.
Table 7.2: Water efficiency of power plants (ψ)
PS1 PS2
PP1 (nuclear) 0.672 0.269
PP2 (coal) 0.687 0.942
PP3 (natural gas) 0.470 0.198
Since the power plants have no capacity limits, we find that the power suppliers only use
their most efficient power plants. However, since PS1 is less efficient than PS2, PS1 loses
some market share to PS2. Although the efficiency of PS1’s most efficient power plant is
still equal to the efficiency of the benchmark scenario, it produces 4.5% less and loses 9% of
its profit. On the other hand, PS2 produces 8.8% more and enjoys a higher profit of nearly
18%. Since the gain of PS2 is twice as the loss of PS1, the power producer surplus shows an
65
increase of almost 5%. Being more efficient gives PS2 a competitive advantage and allows
it to capture an additional 3.25% of market share.
Table 7.3: Outputs of power plants in NIUL scenario
PP11 PP12 PP13 PS1 PP21 PP22 PP23 PS2
0 0 740 740 0 0 843 843
Due to the usage of the most efficient power plants, the average efficiency improved by 30%
from 0.47 103gal/MWh to 0.33 103gal/MWh. Hence, the total output of the power suppliers
and social welfare increased by 2% and 4%, respectively, compared with the benchmark
scenario. Since the demand of water is inelastic, the water supplier’s production increased
marginally.
Figure 7.3: Economic measures: benchmark vs NIUL
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7.3.2.3 Non-identical firms with limited capacity scenario (NIL)
Power plants vary in size and production capacity. In this scenario, we study the effects of
capacity limits on the power plants. We set Qik at 300 MWh, which is much less than the
equilibrium output in the last example. This value is chosen deliberately to capture its effect
on the equilibrium. We compare the equilibrium of this scenario with the benchmark case
to highlight how both capacity limit and different efficiency together impact the economic
measures and compare it with the NIUL scenario to highlight the effect of the capacity limit
only.
We found that when a firm exhausts its most efficient power plant, it starts operating the
next efficient power plant until it reaches the equilibrium point. In this example, the power
suppliers use PP11, PP13, PP21 and PP23 at the maximum capacity and use PP12, PP22 for
the remaining. Since PP12 is more efficient than PP22, it produces more output. This makes
the total output of PS1 higher than PS2. This is because the least efficient unit of the first
power supplier is more efficient that the least efficient unit of the second power supplier.
Table 7.4: Outputs of power plants in NIL scenario
PP11 PP12 PP13 PS1 PP21 PP22 PP23 PS2
300 179 300 779 300 83 300 683
NIL vs benchmark
In this section, we compare the economic measures with those of the benchmark scenario.
Even though the overall weighted efficiency of power plants is almost equal to the efficiency
in the benchmark scenario, the total output of the power market decreased by 5.6%. Al-
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though the producer surplus increased by 5% due to the price increase, the consumer surplus
decreased by around 11%. Thus, social welfare decreased by nearly 2.4%, as shown in Figure
4.
NIL vs NIUL
When this scenario is compared with NIUL, the analysis shows interesting results. The
competitive advantage PS2 had in NIUL is lost due to the capacity limit of the most efficient
power plants. Since the least efficient power plant of PS1 is more efficient that PS2, the
competitive advantage is shifted to PS1 in this scenario. Although the producer surplus
marginally increased by 0.2%, the profit of PS1 increased by 15.5% and the profit of PS2
decreased by 11.7%. The consumers in this scenario are worse off by 14.6% due to the loss of
7.6% of power quantity. Due to the great loss of consumer surplus, social welfare lost about
6%.
Figure 7.4: Economic measures: benchmark vs NIUL vs NIL
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Effect of capacity limit
We illustrate the effect of the capacity limit on the market price in Figure 5. The figure
shows the initial equilibrium at the intersection of the uncapacitated supply curve (dashed
curve) and the demand curve. When supply is capacitated, the part of the supply curve shifts
upward due to the use of a less efficient power plant. The new supply curve intersects with
the demand curve at a higher price and lower quantity, causing an increase of the market
price and the producer surplus.
Figure 7.5: Supply curve shift
7.3.2.4 Water-independent firms with limited capacity scenario (WIL)
An ideal scenario is to replace all water-dependent power plants with water-independent
power plants. All renewable energy sources, except for hydro-power, are almost water-
independent. Wind turbines and solar panels use negligible amounts of water. However, with
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the current state of technology, this scenario might be far-fetched. According to OECD, it is
projected that renewable energy sources will account for around 10% of all energy generated
in 2050. In this scenario, we assume that all firms replaced their traditional power plants
with water-independent power plants with the same capacities of the previous scenario, 300
MWh. Although this scenario may not seem realistic in the foreseeable future, it gives an
insight of the optimal equilibrium when the water efficiency is at its best. Similar to the
benchmark scenario, the power suppliers use any power plants up to the capacity limit. Since
the demand of water by power plants is negligible, all water generated is consumed by the
end-consumers of water. When a power plant becomes water-independent, the water-energy
nexus weakens. Being water-independent helps the power supplier to eliminate a major cost,
which leads to a production increase. All economic measures improve by weakening the
water-energy nexus. The power suppliers, producer surplus and consumer surplus of power
increase by 16% and social welfare increases by 13%.
Figure 7.6: Economic measures: benchmark vs WIL
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CHAPTER 8:
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
8.1 Conclusion
The rapid development of technology and population growth places a lot of pressure on
governments to tackle the scarcity issue of natural resources such as water and energy.
Water and energy are two of the main drivers of humanity and economy. In recent years,
it became apparent that these two resources are interconnected. Hence, the water-energy
nexus concept was born. However, the interactions of firms in a supply chain in a water-
energy nexus have not been investigated. In this research, we approach the water-energy
nexus problem as a game between the firms of the water and power industries. Each firm in
the supply chain decides the quantity to produce using the commodity of the cross industry
as a production input (i.e., water for energy and energy for water) with the objective of
maximizing their own profits.
Four different market structures (i.e., models) are introduced in this research. The first
model considers a monopoly power market and a monopoly water market. In this mode, we
find the Nash equilibrium and analyse various economic measures. We also investigate the
effect of technology efficiency on the same market as well as on the cross market. In the
second model, we consider a duopoly with identical firms in the water market. The purpose
of this model is to investigate the effect of market competition on the market equilibrium
and other economic measures. The third model generalizes the second model by considering
oligopoly markets with identical firms. Another assumption of the above models besides the
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firms being identical is that the firms do not have capacity limits. In the last model, we relax
these assumptions. We also consider that power suppliers may own more than one power
plant. A case study is considered with different scenarios to apply the last model on and to
investigate the effect of technology efficiency and capacity limit.
In the first three models, we solve the problem analytically, find closed-form solutions of
the market equilibrium, and study the effect of technology advancement and competition
increase on the outputs, profits, consumer and producer surpluses and social welfare. We
find that in these market structures, the suppliers of both commodities would either sell
to all customers including the suppliers of the cross-industry (i.e., normal case) or sell only
to the suppliers of the cross-industry under specific market conditions. In the former case,
improving the technology of any firm and increasing competition in any industry increase the
outputs of all firms, the producer surplus and the social welfare. In the latter case, however,
improving technology and increasing competition do not always lead to better outputs and
better economic measures. If the marginal revenue curve of a firm cuts its marginal cost
from above, the outputs of both firms, the producer surplus and the social welfare increase;
otherwise, they decrease.
We also find that depending on the conditions of the markets, there could be a unique Nash
equilibrium or multiple Nash equilibria for the decisions of the firms in the supply chain to
make. In the case of multiple Nash equilibria, the research determined the Pareto optimal
cases, in which all firms are better off, and the consumer and producer surpluses and social
welfare are optimum. In this case, the firms could make vertical coordination to achieve the
equilibrium to capture more profits.
In the fourth model, we formulate the problem as a mixed complementarity problem and
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solve it with the NLPEC solver in GAMS. Any solution satisfies the MCP conditions is a
Nash equilibrium. To validate the model, we consider a case study of the PJM power market.
In PJM, 2% of the power sellers sold about 25% of the total power in the first seven months
of 2019, which indicates that market power is exercised. We develop a numerical example
with two major power suppliers that each own three power plants, and one water supplier.
We study different scenarios to highlight the major findings of the model. The benchmark
scenario assumes identical uncapacitated firms in the power market. In the second scenario,
we assume power plants have different efficiency factors, but still have unlimited production
capacity. In the third scenario, we relax the limited capacity assumption. In the last scenario,
we assume an ideal case with water-independent power plants.
We find that there are multiple Nash equilibria in all scenarios. The firms may not produce
anything leading to loss of profits, surpluses and social welfare, or produce positive outputs
generating profits leading to a better surpluses and improved social welfare. The second
equilibrium is Pareto optimal since producers and consumers are both better off. This case
is guaranteed only if coordination between the two industries is allowed. A government can
provide incentives so that the firms can choose a Pareto optimal decision for the benefit of
all entities involved.
We also find that when power plants have no capacity limits, they only use their most efficient
power plants. A power supplier may have a competitive advantage if its most efficient power
plant is more efficient than that of its rival. However, capacity limits may shift this market
power to the firm with the most efficient underutilized power plant. We also observe that
capacity limits on efficient power plants increase the average cost of production, causing a
market price increase. Although the suppliers earn more profits, social welfare is worse due
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to a decrease of the consumer surplus.
8.2 Future Research
Water, energy and food are crucial resources in our daily lives and will continue to be.
Therefore, understanding the behaviour of the firms in these industries and their interactions
is also crucial in determining appropriate policies. This research is intended to establish a
base for game-theoretic modeling of the water-energy nexus in particular and the water-
energy-food nexus in general. The models in this research do not exploit all the features and
elements of the actual markets. Thus, we highlight some of the possible research directions
in the following:
• The food industry can be included, to have more understanding of the interactions
between the firms in the water, energy and food industries. Research in the energy-
food nexus in the biofuel supply chain is established [64–66].
• As there are price maker firms that influence market price, there are price-taker firms
that represent the majority of the power market. Including price-taker firms in the
models increase its accuracy as their collective production is significant.
• Considering other variables such as transmission constraints and costs, nodal pricing,
the cost of importing water or power from other markets in a nexus is also important.
74
REFERENCES
[1] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). OECD Envi-
ronmental Outlook to 2050. Technical report, OECD Publishing, 2012. URL http:
//dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264122246-en.
[2] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Climate Change 2014 Synthesis
Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri
and L.A. Meyer (eds.)]. Technical report, Geneva, Switzerland, 2014. URL http://www.
ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full_wcover.pdf.
[3] International Energy Agency (IEA). Water for Energy. World Energy Outlook 2012,
2012.
[4] U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The Importance of Water to the U.S.
Economy. Technical report, United States Environmental Protection Agency, 2013.
[5] Al Fry. Facts and Trends: Water, 2006. ISSN 0379-7724.
[6] Jordan Macknick, Robin Newmark, Garvin Heath, and KC Hallett. Operational wa-
ter consumption and withdrawal factors for electricity generating technologies: a re-
view of existing literature. Environmental Research Letters, 7(4):045802, 2012. doi:
10.1088/1748-9326/7/4/045802. URL http://iopscience.iop.org.lib-ezproxy.tamu.edu:
2048/1748-9326/7/4/045802/article/.
[7] U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Energy Sector. URL https://www.dhs.gov/
energy-sector.
75
[8] J Macknick, S Sattler, K Averyt, S Clemmer, and J Rogers. The water implications of
generating electricity: water use across the United States based on different electricity
pathways through 2050. Environmental Research Letters, 7(4):045803, 2012. ISSN 1748-
9326. doi: 10.1088/1748-9326/7/4/045803. URL http://iopscience.iop.org/1748-9326/
7/4/045803/article/.
[9] U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). Saline Water and Salinity. URL http://water.usgs.
gov/edu/saline.html.
[10] Kristen Averyt, Jeremy Fisher, Annette Huber-Lee, Aurana Lewis, Jordan Macknick,
Nadia Madden, John Rogers, and Stacy Tellinghuisen. Freshwater Use by U.S. Power
Plants: Electricity’s Thirst for a Precious Resource. Technical report, 2011.
[11] Christopher B Harto, Molly Finster, Jenna Schroeder, and Corrie Clark. Saline Water
for Power Plant Cooling : Challenges and Opportunities. Technical report, Argonne
National Laboratory, 2014.
[12] J.A. Veil. Use of Reclaimed Water for Power Plant Cooling. Technical report, Argonne
National Laboratory, 2007.
[13] Ashlynn S. Stillwell and Michael E. Webber. Geographic, Technologic, And Economic
Analysis of Using Reclaimed Water for Thermoelectric Power Plant Cooling. Envi-
ronmental Science & Technology, 48(8):4588–4595, 4 2014. ISSN 0013-936X. doi:
10.1021/es405820j. URL http://pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/10.1021/es405820j.
[14] Kelly T Sanders. Critical Review: Uncharted Waters? The Future of the Electricity-
Water Nexus. American Chemical Society, 49(1):51–66, 2015.
76
[15] Michael E. Walker, Ranjani B. Theregowda, Iman Safari, Javad Abbasian, Hamid
Arastoopour, David A. Dzombak, Ming-Kai Hsieh, and David C. Miller. Utilization
of municipal wastewater for cooling in thermoelectric power plants: Evaluation of
the combined cost of makeup water treatment and increased condenser fouling. En-
ergy, 60:139–147, 10 2013. ISSN 03605442. doi: 10.1016/j.energy.2013.07.066. URL
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0360544213006725.
[16] Julia Pyper. Can New Waste Treatment Make Energy and Profits from
Sewage Plants?, 2011. URL https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/
can-new-waste-treatment-make-energy-profits-sewage-plants/.
[17] East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD). Recycling water and energy. URL
http://www.ebmud.com/wastewater/recycling-water-and-energy/.
[18] Madsewer. Sustainability. URL http://www.madsewer.org/Planning/Sustainability.
[19] U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). Energy-Water Nexus: Improvements to
Federal Water Use Data Would Increase Understanding of Trends in Power Plant Water
Use. Technical Report October, 2009. URL http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-23.
[20] Daniel Murrant, Andrew Quinn, and Lee Chapman. The water-energy nexus: Future
water resource availability and its implications on UK thermal power generation. Water
and Environment Journal, 29(3):307–319, 9 2015. ISSN 17476593. doi: 10.1111/wej.
12126. URL http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/wej.12126.
[21] Ashlynn S. Stillwell. Sustainability of Public Policy: Example from the Energy–Water
Nexus. Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management, 141(12), 2015. ISSN
07339496. doi: 10.1061/(ASCE)WR.1943-5452.0000522.
77
[22] Frank Ackerman and Jeremy Fisher. Is there a water-energy nexus in electric-
ity generation? Long-term scenarios for the western United States. Energy Pol-
icy, 59:235–241, 8 2013. ISSN 03014215. doi: 10.1016/j.enpol.2013.03.027. URL
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S030142151300181X.
[23] Lu Liu, Mohamad Hejazi, Pralit Patel, Page Kyle, Evan Davies, Yuyu Zhou, Leon
Clarke, and James Edmonds. Water demands for electricity generation in the U.S.:
Modeling different scenarios for the water-energy nexus. Technological Forecasting and
Social Change, 94:318–334, 5 2015. ISSN 00401625. doi: 10.1016/j.techfore.2014.11.004.
URL http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0040162514003072.
[24] Mateus Ricardo Nogueira Vilanova and José AntÔnio Perrella Balestieri. Ex-
ploring the water-energy nexus in Brazil: The electricity use forwater supply.




[25] Bart Schoonbaert. The water-energy nexus in the UK : Assessing the impact of UK
energy policy on future water use in thermoelectric power generation. PhD thesis, Kings
College, University of London, 2012. URL https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/
geography/study/masters/dissertations/Dissertation-2012-Schoonbaert.pdf.
[26] The Great Lakes Commission. Integrating Energy and Water Resources Decision Mak-
ing in the Great Lakes Basin: An Examination of Future Power Generation Sce-
narios and Water Resource Impacts. Technical Report October, 2011. URL http:
//glpf.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/922-GLEW-Phase-I-Report-FINAL.pdf.
78
[27] Tyler A. DeNooyer, Joshua M. Peschel, Zhenxing Zhang, and Ashlynn S. Stillwell.
Integrating water resources and power generation: The energy–water nexus in Illinois.
Applied Energy, 162:363–371, 2016. ISSN 03062619. doi: 10.1016/j.apenergy.2015.10.
071.
[28] Yuan Chang, Guijun Li, Yuan Yao, Lixiao Zhang, and Chang Yu. Quantifying the
water-energy-food nexus: Current status and trends. Energies, 9(2):1–17, 2016. ISSN
19961073. doi: 10.3390/en9020065.
[29] Xin Li, Kuishuang Feng, Yim Ling Siu, and Klaus Hubacek. Energy-water nexus of wind
power in China: The balancing act between CO 2 emissions and water consumption.
Energy Policy, 45:440–448, 6 2012. ISSN 03014215. doi: 10.1016/j.enpol.2012.02.054.
URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421512001711.
[30] Kuishuang Feng, Klaus Hubacek, Yim Ling Siu, and Xin Li. The energy and water nexus
in Chinese electricity production: A hybrid life cycle analysis. Renewable and Sustain-
able Energy Reviews, 39:342–355, 11 2014. ISSN 13640321. doi: 10.1016/j.rser.2014.07.
080. URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1364032114005322.
[31] Jin Yang and Bin Chen. Energy-water nexus of wind power genera-




[32] Kaufui V. Wong and James Johnston. Cooling Systems for Power Plants in an Energy-
Water Nexus Era. Journal of Energy Resources Technology, 136(1):012001, 2013. ISSN
79
0195-0738. doi: 10.1115/1.4024918. URL http://energyresources.asmedigitalcollection.
asme.org/article.aspx?doi=10.1115/1.4024918.
[33] Mary E. Clayton, Ashlynn S. Stillwell, and Michael E. Webber. Implementation of
brackish groundwater desalination using wind-generated electricity: A case study of the
energy-water nexus in Texas. Sustainability (Switzerland), 6(2):758–778, 2 2014. ISSN
20711050. doi: 10.3390/su6020758. URL http://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/6/2/758/.
[34] Zachary A. Barker and Ashlynn S. Stillwell. Implications of Transitioning from de
Facto to Engineered Water Reuse for Power Plant Cooling. Environmental Science and
Technology, 50(10):5379–5388, 5 2016. ISSN 15205851. doi: 10.1021/acs.est.5b05753.
URL http://pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/10.1021/acs.est.5b05753.
[35] Benjamin K Sovacool and Kelly E Sovacool. Identifying future electricity–water tradeoffs
in the United States. Energy Policy, 37:2763–2773, 2009. doi: 10.1016/j.enpol.2009.03.
012.
[36] Kerron J. Gabriel, Mahmoud M. El-Halwagi, and Patrick Linke. Optimization across
the Water-Energy Nexus for Integrating Heat, Power, and Water for Industrial Pro-
cesses, Coupled with Hybrid Thermal-Membrane Desalination. Industrial and Engi-
neering Chemistry Research, 55(12):3442–3466, 2016. ISSN 15205045. doi: 10.1021/acs.
iecr.5b03333. URL http://pubs.acs.org.ezproxy.lib.uwm.edu/doi/pdf/10.1021/acs.iecr.
5b03333.
[37] Mariano Martín and Ignacio E. Grossmann. Water-energy nexus in biofuels production
and renewable based power. Sustainable Production and Consumption, 2(February):
96–108, 2015. ISSN 23525509. doi: 10.1016/j.spc.2015.06.005. URL http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.spc.2015.06.005.
80
[38] Gary Gold and Michael Webber. The Energy-Water Nexus: An Analysis and Com-
parison of Various Configurations Integrating Desalination with Renewable Power. Re-
sources, 4(2):227–276, 4 2015. ISSN 2079-9276. doi: 10.3390/resources4020227. URL
http://www.mdpi.com/2079-9276/4/2/227/.
[39] Apoorva Santhosh, Amro M. Farid, and Kamal Youcef-Toumi. The impact of storage
facility capacity and ramping capabilities on the supply side economic dispatch of the
energy-water nexus. Energy, 66:363–377, 2014. ISSN 03605442. doi: 10.1016/j.energy.
2014.01.031.
[40] Xiaodong Zhang and Velimir V Vesselinov. Energy-water nexus: Balancing the tradeoffs
between two-level decision makers. Applied Energy, 183:77–87, 2016. ISSN 0306-2619.
doi: 10.1016/j.apenergy.2016.08.156. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2016.
08.156.
[41] Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael Whinston, D., and Jerry R. Green. Microeconomic Theory.
page 1008, 1995.
[42] Li He, Yizhong Chen, Honghai Zhao, Peipei Tian, Yuxuan Xue, and Liang Chen. Game-
based analysis of energy-water nexus for identifying environmental impacts during Shale
gas operations under stochastic input. Science of the Total Environment, 627:1585–1601,
2018. ISSN 18791026. doi: 10.1016/j.scitotenv.2018.02.004.
[43] Anik Bhaduri and Jens Liebe. Cooperation in Transboundary Water Sharing with
Issue Linkage: Game-Theoretical Case Study in the Volta Basin. Journal of Wa-
ter Resources Planning and Management, 139(3):235–245, 2013. ISSN 0733-9496.
doi: 10.1061/(ASCE)WR.1943-5452.0000252. URL http://ascelibrary.org/doi/10.1061/
%28ASCE%29WR.1943-5452.0000252.
81
[44] Kaveh Madani. Hydropower licensing and climate change: Insights from cooperative
game theory. Advances in Water Resources, 34(2):174–183, 2011. ISSN 03091708. doi:
10.1016/j.advwatres.2010.10.003. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.advwatres.2010.10.
003.
[45] Vishnuteja Nanduri andWilkistar Otieno. A NewWater and Carbon Conscious Electric-
ity Market Model for the Electricity-Water-Climate Change Nexus. Electricity Journal,
24(9):64–74, 2011. ISSN 10406190. doi: 10.1016/j.tej.2011.09.021.
[46] Vishnu Nanduri and Ivan Saavedra-Antolínez. A competitive Markov decision pro-
cess model for the energy–water–climate change nexus. Applied Energy, 111:186–
198, 11 2013. ISSN 03062619. doi: 10.1016/j.apenergy.2013.04.033. URL http:
//www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306261913003280.
[47] U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). Today in Energy, 2011. URL https:
//www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=790.
[48] M. Pulido-Velazquez, E. Alvarez-Mendiola, and J. Andreu. Design of Efficient Water
Pricing Policies Integrating Basinwide Resource Opportunity Costs. Journal of Water
Resources Planning and Management, 139(5):583–592, 2012. ISSN 0733-9496. doi:
10.1061/(asce)wr.1943-5452.0000262.
[49] Robin Kundis Craig. Adapting Water Federalism To Climate Change Impacts: Energy
Policy, Food Security, and the Allocation of Water Resources. Environment & Energy
Law & Policy Journal, 5(February):183–236, 2010. URL http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1555944.
82
[50] Murray–Darling Basin Authority. Water markets in the Murray – Darling Basin. Tech-
nical Report July, Australian Government, 2015.
[51] Axel Dreves, Francisco Facchine, Christian Kanzow, and Simone Sagratella. On the
solution of the KKT conditions of generalized Nash equilibrium problems. SIAM Journal
on Optimization, 21(3):1082–1108, 2011. ISSN 10526234. doi: 10.1137/100817000. URL
http://www.siam.org/journals/ojsa.php.
[52] Jeffrey Church and Roger Ware. Industrial Organization : A Strategic Approach,
volume 12. McGraw-Hill, New York City, NY, 2000. ISBN 025620571X. URL
http://works.bepress.com/jeffrey_church/23/.
[53] Steven M. LaValle. Planning Algorithms. Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, 2006. ISBN 9780511546877. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511546877. URL
http://planning.cs.uiuc.edu/node461.htmlhttps://www.cambridge.org/core/product/
identifier/9780511546877/type/book.
[54] H. Chen, K.P. Wong, D.H.M Nguyen, and C.Y. Chung. Analyzing oligopolistic electric-
ity market using coevolutionary computation. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems,
21(1):143–152, 2006. doi: 10.1109/TPWRS.2005.862005.
[55] Benjamin F. Hobbs. Linear complementarity models of nash-Cournot competition in
bilateral and POOLCO power markets. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 16(2):
194–202, 2001. doi: 10.1109/59.918286.
[56] A.S. Chuang, F. Wu, and P. Varaiya. A game-theoretic model for generation expansion
planning: problem formulation and numerical comparisons. IEEE Transactions on
83
Power Systems, 16(4):885–891, 2001. ISSN 08858950. doi: 10.1109/59.962441. URL
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/962441/.
[57] Stephen Merret. Introduction to the Economics of Water Resources. 1997. ISBN
0203645391. doi: 10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004.
[58] Andrew C. Worthington. Commercial and industrial water demand estimation: The-
oretical and methodological guidelines for applies economics research. Estudios de
Economía Aplicada, 28(2):237–258, 2010. doi: ISSN1697-5731. URL http://www.
redalyc.org/html/301/30120357002/.
[59] Michael C Ferris and Todd S Munson. Complementarity Problems in GAMS and the
PATH Solver. 1998. URL http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~ferris/techreports/98-12.pdf.
[60] Nabeel Hamoud and Jaejin Jang. The Effect of Technology Efficiency and Market
Competition on a Closed-Loop Water-Energy Nexus. International Journal of Energy
Research, page under review, 2019.
[61] PJM. PJM Manual 11 :Services, Ancillary Operations, Market Operations, Real-time
Market. Technical report, 2019. URL https://www.pjm.com/~/media/documents/
manuals/m11.ashx.
[62] Ronald C. Griffin. Water Resource Economics: The Analysis of Scarcity Policies and
Projects. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass, 12 2006. ISBN 026207267X.
[63] R. Goldstein and W. Smith. Water & Sustainability: U.S. Electricity Consumption for
Water Supply & Treatment - The Next Half Century. Technical Report Volume 4, 2002.
URL http://www.circleofblue.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/EPRI-Volume-4.pdf.
84
[64] Amirsaman H. Bajgiran, Jaejin Jang, Xiang Fang, and James H. Peoples. A biofuel
supply chain equilibrium analysis with subsidy consideration. International Journal of
Energy Research, 43(5):1848–1867, 2019. ISSN 1099114X. doi: 10.1002/er.4422.
[65] Yun Bai, Yanfeng Ouyang, and Jong Shi Pang. Biofuel supply chain design under
competitive agricultural land use and feedstock market equilibrium. Energy Economics,
34(5):1623–1633, 2012. ISSN 01409883. doi: 10.1016/j.eneco.2012.01.003. URL http:
//dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2012.01.003.
[66] Xiaolei Wang, Yanfeng Ouyang, Hai Yang, and Yun Bai. Optimal biofuel sup-
ply chain design under consumption mandates with renewable identification num-
bers. Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, 57:158–171, 11 2013. ISSN




WATER USAGE OF NON-RENEWABLE POWER
PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGIES
Table A.1: Water consumption factors for non-renewable technologies
(gal/MWh)
Fuel Type Cooling Technology Median Min Max
Nuclear Tower Generic 672 581 845
Once-through Generic 269 100 400
Pond Generic 610 560 720
Natural Gas Tower Combined Cycle 198 130 300
Steam 826 662 1,170
Combined Cycle with CCS 378 378 378
Once-through Combined Cycle 100 20 100
Steam 240 95 291
pond Combined Cycle 240 240 240
Dry Combined Cycle 2 0 4
Inlet Steam 340 80 600
Coal Tower Generic 687 480 1,100
Subcritical 471 394 664
Supercritical 493 458 594
IGCC 372 318 439
Subcritical with CCS 942 942 942
continued on next page
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Supercritical with CCS 846 846 846
IGCC with CCS 540 522 558
Once-through Generic 250 100 317
Subcritical 113 71 138
Supercritical 103 64 124
Pond Generic 545 300 700
Subcritical 779 737 804
Supercritical 42 4 64
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Table A.2: Water withdrawal factors for non-renewable technologies (gal/MWh)
Fuel Type Cooling Technology Median Min Max
Nuclear Tower Generic 1,101 800 2,600
Once-through Generic 44,350 25,000 60,000
Pond Generic 7,050 500 13,000
Natural Gas Tower Combined Cycle 253 150 283
Steam 1,203 950 1,460
Combined Cycle with CCS 496 487 506
Once-through Combined Cycle 11,380 7,500 20,000
Steam 35,000 10,000 60,000
Pond Combined Cycle 5,950 5,950 5,950
Dry Combined Cycle 2 0 4
Inlet Steam 425 100 750
Coal Tower Generic 1,005 500 1,200
Subcritical 531 463 678
Supercritical 609 582 669
IGCC 390 358 605
Subcritical with CCS 1,277 1,224 1,329
Supercritical with CCS 1,123 1,098 1,148
IGCC with CCS 586 479 678
Once-through Generic 36,350 20,000 50,000
Subcritical 27,088 27,046 27,113
Supercritical 22,590 22,551 22,611
continued on next page
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Pond Generic 12,225 300 24,000
Subcritical 17,914 17,859 17,927
Supercritical 15,046 14,996 15,057
Biopower Tower Steam 878 500 1,460
Once-through Steam 35,000 20,000 50,000
Pond Steam 450 300 600
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APPENDIX B:
ANALYSIS OF MODEL I
Appendices B1-B3 provide proofs of three of the possible equilibria of Model I. As discussed
in the text, only these equilibria result in positive outputs and profits. Appendix B.4 sum-
marizes related economic measures of the equilibria. Appendix B.5 proves that the profits,
consumer surplus, producer surplus and social welfare in case I-1 is higher than in the other
cases when there are multiple equilibria. The KKT conditions of this model shown in sec.
4.1.1 can be rewritten as follows:
A− 2Bq − (a− bw)ψ − ψλ1 ≤ 0 (B.1)
a− 2bw − (A−Bq) ε− ελ2 ≤ 0 (B.2)
ψq − w ≤ 0 (B.3)
εw − q ≤ 0 (B.4)
(A− 2Bq − (a− bw)ψ − ψλ1) q = 0 (B.5)
(a− 2bw − (A−Bq) ε− ελ2)w = 0 (B.6)
(ψq − w)λ1 = 0 (B.7)
(εw − q)λ2 = 0 (B.8)
q ≥ 0 (B.9)
w ≥ 0 (B.10)
λ1 ≥ 0 (B.11)
λ2 ≥ 0 (B.12)
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B.1 Proof of the equilibrium of case I-1
In this case, it is assumed that λ1 = λ2 = 0
From (B.3),
εψw ≤ ψq (B.1.1)
From (B.4),
ψq ≤ w (B.1.2)
From (B.1.1) and (B.1.2),
εψw ≤ ψq ≤ w (B.1.3)
From (B.1.3)
εψ ≤ 1 (B.1.4)
From (B.5), the best response of the power supplier:
qBR =
(A− ψ (a− bw))
2B
(B.1.5)
















From (B.1.4, B.1.7 and B.1.8), the denominators are positive, thus the numerators should
also be positive because q and w > 0, which follows,
(2− εψ)A− aψ > 0 (input condition for q) (B.1.9)
(2− εψ) a− Aε > 0 (input condition for w) (B.1.10)










(B.1.11) shows that if εψ = 1 , the RHS = LHS, which is not possible in this case. Thus,
εψ < 1 (B.1.4’)
From (B.3, B.1.7 and B.1.8),
εB ((2− εψ) a− Aε) ≤ b ((2− εψ)A− aψ) (B.1.12)
From (B.4, B.1.7 and B.1.8),
ψb ((2− εψ)A− aψ) ≤ B ((2− εψ) a− Aε) (B.1.13)
From (B.1.12) and (B.1.13),
((2− εψ) εB + ψb) ε
((2− εψ) b+ ε2B)
≤ Aε
a




We want to check if either (B.1.11) or (B.1.14) is redundant. Let us first compare the
RHSs of (B.1.11) and (B.1.14).
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We assume (B.1.14) ≤ (B.1.11):




5εψ ≤ 4 + (εψ)2
Given (B.1.4′), we know that (B.1.14) is less than or equal to (B.1.11). Now, we compare
the LHSs of (B.1.11) and (B.1.14). Let us assume (B.1.11) ≤ (B.1.14),
ψ
(2− εψ)
≤ ((2− εψ) εB + ψb)
((2− εψ) b+ ε2B)
5εψ ≤ 4 + (εψ)2
Given (B.1.4’), this equation always holds, and we know that the LHS of (B.1.14) is greater
than or equal to (B.1.11). From the comparisons above, (B.1.14) is a subset of (B.1.11);
that is, if (B.1.14) holds, (B.1.11) holds.
Summary of input conditions:
εψ < 1 and
((2− εψ) εB + ψb) ε
((2− εψ) b+ ε2B)
≤ Aε
a
≤ ((2− εψ)B + ψ
2b) ε
((2− εψ)ψb+ εB)
B.2 Proof of the equilibrium of case I-2
In this case, it is assumed that λ1 > 0 and λ2 = 0
From (B.7),
ψq = w (B.2.1)
From (B.4),
εw ≤ q (B.2.2)
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From (B.2.1) and (B.2.2),
εψw ≤ w (B.2.3)
From (B.2.3),
εψ ≤ 1 (B.2.4)
From (B.5),
qBR =








Solving (B.2.1), (B.2.5) and (B.2.6) for w and q, we find the equilibrium outputs and shadow
price:
w = − ψ (a− Aε)
(Bε− 2bψ)
(B.2.7)




2Ba− ABε− 2Abψ + abψ2 + Abεψ2 −Baεψ
ψ (Bε− 2bψ)
> 0 (B.2.9)


















((2− εψ)B + bψ2) ε






from q,w > 0,
Aε
a
< 1# (12) (B.2.12)




((2− εψ)B + bψ2) ε
((2− εψ) bψ + εB)
# (13) (B.2.13)
























((2− εψ)B + ψ2b) ε
((2− εψ)ψb+ εB)
( case I-2.B)
B.3 Proof of the equilibrium of case I-3
From (B.3), In this case, it is assumed that λ1 = 0 and λ2 > 0
ψq ≤ w (B.3.1)
From (B.8),
εw = q (B.3.2)
From (B.3.1) and (B.3.2),
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εψq ≤ q (B.3.3)
From (3),








a− (A−Bq) ε− ελ2
2b
(B.3.6)











2Ab− 2Baε− abψ + ABε2 +Baε2ψ − Abεψ
ε (2Bε− bψ)
> 0 (B.3.9)










































((2− εψ)Bε+ bψ) ε
((2− εψ) b+Bε2)
(B.3.13)
From (B.3.4), if εψ = 1, (B.3.10) = (B.3.11) which is not possible; thus,
εψ < 1











((2− εψ) εB + ψb) ε









((2− εψ) εB + ψb) ε




< εψ (case I-3.B)
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B.4 Economic measures of Model I














Consumer Surplus (Power) CSP
(aψ − 2A+ Aεψ)2
2B (4− εψ)2
Consumer Surplus (Water) CSW
(Aε− 2a+ aεψ)2
2b (4− εψ)2
Total Social Welfare SW
3 (πPP + πWP )
2














Consumer Surplus (Power) CSP
B (a− Aε)2
2 (Bε− 2bψ)2
Consumer Surplus (Water) CSW
bψ2 (a− Aε)2
2 (Bε− 2bψ)2
Total Social Welfare SW
(Aε− a) (B (a+ Aε− 2aεψ)− bψ (4A+ aψ − 5Aεψ))
2 (Bε− 2bψ)2
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(aψ − A)Ab (1− εψ) +Bε (Aε− a (2− εψ))
(2Bε− bψ)2
Consumer Surplus (Power) CSP
Bε2 (A− aψ)2
2 (2Bε− bψ)2
Consumer Surplus (Water) CSW
b (A− aψ)2
2 (2Bε− bψ)2
Total Social Welfare SW
(aψ − A) (b (A+ aψ − 2Aεψ)−Bε (4a+ Aε− 5aεψ))
2 (2Bε− bψ)2
B.5 Proof of Pareto optimality of case I-1 (multiple equi-
libria)
As discussed in the text, there are input conditions that have multiple equilibria, as in case
I-1 and case I-2.B (or case I-3). In this part, we prove that the equilibrium of case I-1 is
pareto optimal (i.e. the profits, consumer surpluses and social welfare in case I-1 are higher
than those in case I-2 (or case I-3)).
The profit of the power supplier:
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Factoring π1,1P − π
1,2
P , we get the product of the terms (B.5.1) to (B.5.5) given below:
ABε− 2Ba+ 2Abψ − abψ2 − Abεψ2 +Baεψ < 0 (B.5.1)
ABε3ψ2 −Baε2ψ2 − 4ABε2ψ − 4Abεψ2 + 8Baεψ + 4ABε− 4abψ2 + 8Abψ − 8Ba < 0
(B.5.2)
1/B > 0 (B.5.3)
1/ (εψ − 4)2 > 0 (B.5.4)
1/ (Bε− 2bψ)2 > 0 (B.5.5)
Here, (B.5.3), (B.5.4) and (B.5.5) are positive. π1,1P > π
1,2
P if equations (B.5.1) and (B.5.2)
are both positive or both negative.
Proof of (B.5.1):




((2− εψ)B + ψ2b) ε
((2− εψ)ψb+ εB)
, (B.5.6)
which is always true since (B.5.6) is the input condition of cases I-1 and I-2.
Proof of (B.5.2):
Setting ABε3ψ2−Baε2ψ2− 4ABε2ψ− 4Abεψ2 + 8Baεψ+ 4ABε− 4abψ2 + 8Abψ− 8Ba < 0




(Bε2ψ2 − 8Bεψ + 4bψ2 + 8B) ε
(Bε3ψ2 − 4Bε2ψ − 4bεψ2 + 4Bε+ 8bψ)
(B.5.7)
Given the assumptions that Aε/a > 1 and Bε/bψ > 2 (from case I-2.B), we find that
(B.5.6) is a subset of (B.5.7). Thus, (B.5.7) always holds. Therefore, π1,1P > π
1,2
P , and by
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symmetry π1,1P > π
1,3
P
The profit of the water supplier:
Factoring π1,1W − π
1,2
W , we get the value is a product of the terms (8) to (13) given below:
ε > 0 (B.5.8)
ABε− 2Ba+ 2Abψ − abψ2 − Abεψ2 +Baεψ < 0 (see proof of ( B.5.1)) (B.5.9)
Abε2ψ2 +Baε2ψ + ABε2 − 3abεψ2 − 6Abεψ − 2Baε+ 8abψ < 0 (B.5.10)
1/b > 0 (B.5.11)
1/ (εψ − 4)2 > 0 (B.5.12)
1/ (Bε− 2bψ)2 > 0 (B.5.13)
Proof of (B.5.10):






(2− εψ)− 8 + 3εψ
Bε
bψ




< 6− εψ (B.5.14)
Examining (B.5.14), we find that if Bε/bψ < 6 − εψ, the RHS is less than 1. Given that
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Aε/a > 1 from the input conditions of case I-2.B, the equation always holds. If Bε/bψ >
6− εψ, (B.5.14) is always greater than ((2− εψ)B + ψ2b) ε/ (((2− εψ)ψb+ εB)) (an input
condition of case I-2.B). Thus, (B.5.10) is strictly negative and π1,1W > π
1,2




The consumer surplus of the power industry:
Factoring CS1,1P − CS
1,2
P , we get the factors (15) to (20) given below:
2 > 0 (B.5.15)
ABε2ψ − Abεψ2 − 3ABε− abψ2 + 2Abψ + 2Ba < 0 (see proof below) (B.5.16)
ABε− 2Ba+ 2Abψ − abψ2 − Abεψ2 +Baεψ < 0 (see proof of (B.5.1)) (B.5.17)
1/B > 0 (B.5.18)
1/ (εψ − 4) > 0 (B.5.19)
1/ (Bε− 2bψ)2 > 0 (B.5.20)
Proof of (B.5.16):




(2B − bψ2) ε
−Bε2ψ + bεψ2 + 3Bε− 2bψ
(B.5.21)
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Given that Aε/a > 1 from the input conditions of case I-2.B, equation (B.5.21) always
holds and is negative. Thus, CS1,1P > CS
1,2
P
The consumer surplus of the water industry:
Factoring CS1,1w − CS1,2w , we get the factors (22) to (28) given below:
1/2 > 0 (B.5.22)
ε > 0 (B.5.23)
ABε− 2Ba+ 2Abψ − abψ2 − Abεψ2 +Baεψ < 0 (see proof of (B.5.1) (B.5.24)
Abε2ψ2+Baε2ψ+ABε2−3abεψ2−6Abεψ−2Baε+8abψ < 0 (see proof of (B.5.10) (B.5.25)
1/b > 0 (B.5.26)
1/ (εψ − 4)2 > 0 (B.5.27)
1/ (Bε− 2bψ)2 > 0 (B.5.28)
Given the product of equations (B.5.22)-(B.5.28) is positive, CS1,1w > CS1,2w
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B.6 Effect of technology improvement on the economic
measures of Model I
This section shows the effect of the improvement of the power and water technologies on
various economic measures. We show the results for cases I-1 and I-2.A. for the results for
case I-3 is symmetrical to results for case I-2.
























(8a+ 4Aε) (aψ − 2A+ Aεψ)




2ψ (2A+ aψ) (aψ − 2A+ Aεψ)




2ε (2a+ Aε) (Aε− 2a+ aεψ)




(8A+ 4aψ) (Aε− 2a+ aεψ)




(4a+ 2Aε) (aψ − 2A+ Aεψ)




ψ (2A+ aψ) (aψ − 2A+ Aεψ)




ε (2a+ Aε) (Aε− 2a+ aεψ)




(4A+ 2aψ) (Aε− 2a+ aεψ)
b (εψ − 4)3
> 0
continued on next page
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−∂SW
∂ψ
−(2a+ Aε) ((12Ab+ 6Baε− 3ABε
2)− ψ (6ab+ 6Abε+ 3Baε2))




−(2A+ aψ) ((12Ba+ 6Abψ − 3abψ
2)− ε (6AB + 6Baψ + 3Abψ2))
Bb (εψ − 4)3
> 0






































































2ψ −Bb (2a− ψ (3aε− 5Aε2)) +B2aε2)
(Bε− 2bψ)3
(3)
continued on next page
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−∂SW
∂ε

























2 + 3bψε− 2b)
bψ (−5Bε2 + 4b)
The values of the measures (1), (2), and (3) for case I-2B are the same as those of case I-2A,
but the sign directions are opposite. The other measures are all positive in case 1-2B.
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APPENDIX C:
ANALYSIS OF MODEL II
This section provides proofs of three of the possible equilibria of Model II. As discussed in
the text, these equilibria result in positive outputs and profits. The KKT conditions of this
model can be rewritten as follows:
A− 2Bq − (a− b (w1 + w2))ψ − ψλ1 ≤ 0 (C.1)
a− 2bw1 − bw2 − (A−Bq) ε− ελ2 ≤ 0 (C.2)
a− bw1 − 2bw2 − (A−Bq) ε− ελ2 ≤ 0 (C.3)
ψq − (w1 + w2) ≤ 0 (C.4)
ε (w1 + w2)− q ≤ 0 (C.5)
(A− 2Bq − (a− b (w1 + w2))ψ − ψλ1) q = 0 (C.6)
(a− 2bw1 − bw2 − (A−Bq) ε− ελ2)w1 = 0 (C.7)
(a− bw1 − 2bw2 − (A−Bq) ε− ελ2)w2 = 0 (C.8)
(ψq − (w1 + w2))λ1 = 0 (C.9)
(ε (w1 + w2)− q)λ2 = 0 (C.10)
q ≥ 0 (C.11)
w1 ≥ 0 (C.12)
w2 ≥ 0 (C.13)
λ1 ≥ 0 (C.14)
λ2 ≥ 0 (C.15)
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C.1 Proof of the equilibrium of case II-1
In this case, it is assumed that λ1 = 0 and λ2 = 0
From (C.6),
q =










(a− bw1 − ε (A−Bq))
2b
(C.1.3)
From (C.1.2) into (C.1.1), the best response of the power supplier:
qBR = −2A− aψ − Aεψ + bψw2
B (εψ − 4)
(C.1.4)





The optimal outputs of the water supplier (from (C.1.4) into (C.1.5)):
w2 =
Aε− 2a+ aεψ
2b (εψ − 3)
(C.1.6)
and the optimal output of the power supplier ((C.1.6) into (C.1.4)):
q =
aψ − 3A+ 2Aεψ
2B (εψ − 3)
(C.1.7)




2b (εψ − 3)
(C.1.8)
From (C.4), the demand of water by the power supplier should not exceed the available water
ψq ≤ w1 + w2 (C.1.9)
From (C.5), the demand of power by the water suppliers should not exceed the available
power
ε (w1 + w2) ≤ q (C.1.10)
From (C.1.9) and (C.1.10),
εψ ≤ 1 (C.1.11)
Given (C.1.11), the denominators of (C.1.6), (C.1.7) and (8) are negative; thus, the numer-
ators must be negative. From (C.1.6) and (C.1.8),
Aε
a














< 2− εψ (C.1.14)
From (C.1.14),
if εψ = 1, then
εψ
(3− 2εψ)
= 2− εψ, which contradicts (C.1.14)
Thus,
εψ < 1 (C.1.11’)
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From (C.1.6), (C.1.7) and (C.1.8) into (C.4) and (EE),
(bψ + 2Bε (2− εψ)) ε




2 + 4B − 2Bεψ) ε
(2Bε+ 3bψ − 2bεψ2)
(C.1.15)
Comparing the RHSs and LHSs of (C.1.14) and (C.1.15), we find that (C.1.15) is a subset
of (C.1.14).
Summary of input conditions:
εψ < 1 and
(bψ + 2Bε (2− εψ)) ε




2 + 4B − 2Bεψ) ε
(2Bε+ 3bψ − 2bεψ2)
C.2 Proof of the equilibrium of case II-2
In this case, it is assumed that λ1 > 0 and λ2 = 0
From (C.6),
q =














ψq = (w1 + w2) (C.2.4)
Solving (C.2.1)-(C.2.4), we find the following equilibrium outputs and shadow price:
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q = − 2 (a− Aε)
2Bε− 3bψ
(C.2.5)



























(bψ2 + 4B − 2Bεψ) ε








(bψ2 + 4B − 2Bεψ) ε












From (C.2.9) and (C.2.10),
εψ ≤ 1 (C.2.10)




ε (bψ2 + 4B − 2Bεψ)
(2Bε+ 3bψ − 2bεψ2)
= 1, which is not possible
Thus,
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εψ < 1 (C.2.10’)








(bψ2 + 4B − 2Bεψ) ε















(bψ2 + 4B − 2Bεψ) ε
(2Bε+ 3bψ − 2bεψ2)
(case II-2.B)
C.3 Proof of the equilibrium of case II-3
Following the same logic of case II-2, the Nash equilibrium outputs of the water supplier and








3Ab− 4Baε− abψ + 2ABε2 + 2Baε2ψ − 2Abεψ
2ε (2Bε− bψ)











ε (bψ + (2− εψ) 2Bε)









ε (bψ + (2− εψ) 2Bε)




< εψ (case II-2.B)
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C.4 Economic measures of Model II
Table C.1: Economic measures of case II-1
Economic Measure Value
q
aψ − 3A+ 2Aεψ
2B (εψ − 3)
w1 = w2
Aε− 2a+ aεψ
2b (εψ − 3)
πP
(aψ − 3A+ 2Aεψ)2
4B (εψ − 3)2
πw1 = πw2
(Aε− 2a+ aεψ)2
4b (εψ − 3)2
CSP
(aψ − 3A+ 2Aεψ)2
8B (εψ − 3)2
CSW
(Aε− 2a+ aεψ)2
2b (εψ − 3)2
PSp
(aψ − 3A+ 2Aεψ)2
4B (εψ − 3)2
PSw
(Aε− 2a+ aεψ)2
2b (εψ − 3)2





Table C.2: Economic measures of case II-2
Economic Measure Value
q − 2 (a− Aε)
2Bε− 3bψ






















(a− Aε) (bψ (aψ − 7Aεψ + 3A)− 2B (a+ Aε− 2aεψ))
(2Bε− 3bψ)2
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πw1 = πw2 −












(A− aψ) (Ab (1− εψ) +Bε (Aε− 2a+ aεψ))
(2Bε− bψ)2
SW −(A− aψ) (Ab(1− 2εψ)− 4Bε(a+ Aε− 2aεψ) + abψ)
4 (2Bε− bψ)2
C.5 Proof of the effect of competition on the producer
surplus of the water market (case 1)
The producer surplus of the water industry of case II-1 is larger than that of the water
industry of case I-1 if and only if εψ > 2−
√
2 when both input conditions of Propositions 1
and 4 are met.
Proof:
PS2,1w − PS1,1w =
(ε2ψ2 − 4εψ + 2) (Aε− 2a+ aεψ)2
−2b (−7εψ + ε2ψ2 + 12)2
The denominator is negative. The numerator is negative if and only if ε2ψ2 − 4εψ + 2 <
0.
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Given εψ < 1, we have PS2,1w > PS1,1w iff εψ > 2−
√
2
C.6 Proof of the effect of competition on the producer
surplus of the power market (case 1)
The producer surplus of the power supplier in a supply chain with water competition is
always greater than its profit when there is a monopolist water supplier in the supply chain
when both input conditions of Propositions 1 and 4 are met.
Proof:
Factoring PS2,1p − PS1,1p , we get the factors below:
−1/4 < 0 (C.6.1)
ψ > 0 (C.6.2)
4Aε2ψ2 + 3aεψ2 − 21Aεψ − 10aψ + 24A > 0 (see proof below) (C.6.3)
Aε− 2a+ aεψ < 0 (C.6.4)
1/B > 0 (C.6.5)
(1/ (εψ − 4))2 > 0 (C.6.6)
(1/ (εψ − 3))2 > 0 (C.6.7)
Notice that (C.6.4) is negative from the positivity condition of case II-1. Thus, PS2,1p −





4ε2ψ2 − 21εψ + 24




C.7 Proof of the effect of competition on the consumer
surplus of the water market (case 1)
The consumer surplus of the water industry in a supply chain with water competition is
greater than that with a monopolist water supplier; when both input conditions of Proposi-
tions 1 and 4 are met.
Proof:
CS2,1w − CS1,1w =
(7− 2εψ) (Aε− 2a+ aεψ)2
2b (−7εψ + ε2ψ2 + 12)2
since εψ < 1, CS2,1w > CS1,1w
C.8 Proof of the effect of competition on the consumer
surplus of the power market (case 1)
The consumer surplus of the power industry in a supply chain with water competition is
greater than that of with a monopolist water supplier when both input conditions of Propo-
sitions 1 and 4 are met.
Proof:
CS2,1p − CS1,1p =
(aψ − 3A+ 2Aεψ)2
4B (εψ − 3) (2εψ − 6)
− (aψ − 2A+ Aεψ)
2
2B (εψ − 4)2
CS2,1p − CS1,1p > 0 if
εψ (10− 3εψ)











ANALYSIS OF MODEL III
D.1 Economic measures of Model III
Table D.1: Economic measures of case III-1
Economic Measure Value
q0 = qi −
aψ − Am− 2A+ Aεψ + Aεmψ
B (2m+ 2n− εψ +mn− εmψ − εnψ − εmnψ + 4)
w0 = wj −
Aε− 2a− an+ aεψ + aεnψ
b (2m+ 2n− εψ +mn− εmψ − εnψ − εmnψ + 4)
πp,0 = πp,i
(aψ − Am− 2A+ Aεψ + Aεmψ)2
B(2m+ 2n− εψ +mn− εmψ − εnψ − εmnψ + 4)2
πw,0 = πw,j
(Aε− 2a− an+ aεψ + aεnψ)2
b(2m+ 2n− εψ +mn− εmψ − εnψ − εmnψ + 4)2
CSP
(n+ 1)2(aψ − Am− 2A+ Aεψ + Aεmψ)2
2B(2m+ 2n− εψ +mn− εmψ − εnψ − εmnψ + 4)2
CSW
(m+ 1)2(Aε− 2a− an+ aεψ + aεnψ)2
2b(2m+ 2n− εψ +mn− εmψ − εnψ − εmnψ + 4)2
PSp
(n+ 1) (aψ − Am− 2A+ Aεψ + Aεmψ)2
B(2m+ 2n− εψ +mn− εmψ − εnψ − εmnψ + 4)2
PSw
(m+ 1) (Aε− 2a− an+ aεψ + aεnψ)2
b(2m+ 2n− εψ +mn− εmψ − εnψ − εmnψ + 4)2
SW CSp + CSw + PSp + PSw
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Table D.2: Economic measures of case III-2
Economic Measure Value
q0 = qi −
a− Aε+ am− Aεm
(n+ 1) (Bε− 2bψ +Bεm− bmψ)
w0 = wj −
aψ − Aεψ
Bε− 2bψ +Bεm− bmψ
πp,0 = πp,i
z(bψ (aψ + A(−2 + εψ −m+ εmψ)) +Ba (1 +m− εψ − εmψ))
(n+ 1) (Bε− 2bψ +Bεm− bmψ)2
πw,0 = πw,j
bψ2(a− Aε)2
(Bε− 2bψ +Bεm− bmψ)2
CSP
B(a− Aε)2(m+ 1)2
2(Bε− 2bψ +Bεm− bmψ)2
CSW
bψ2(a− Aε)2(m+ 1)2
2(Bε− 2bψ +Bεm− bmψ)2
PSp
z(bψ (aψ + A(−2 + εψ −m+ εmψ)) +Ba (1 +m− εψ − εmψ))
(Bε− 2bψ +Bεm− bmψ)2
PSw
bψ2(a− Aε)2 (m+ 1)
(Bε− 2bψ +Bεm− bmψ)2
SW CSp + CSw + PSp + PSw
* z = (Aε− a) (m+ 1)
D.2 Proof of the effect of competition on the total output
of the same industry (case III-1)




= − (m+ 2) (aψ − Am− 2A+ Aεψ + Aεmψ)
B (2m+ 2n− εψ +mn− εmψ − εnψ − εmnψ + 4)2
> 0
For the numerator:
aψ − Am− 2A+ Aεψ + Aεmψ < 0 always holds based on the positivity conditions of q1i
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For the denominator:
2m+ 2n− εψ +mn− εmψ − εnψ − εmnψ + 4 > 0 always holds since εψ < 1
D.3 Proof of the effect of competition on individual out-
puts and profits of the firms in the same industry
(case III-1)
In the normal case, increasing the number of firms in one industry decreases the individual




(2 +m− εψ − εmψ) (aψ − Am− 2A+ Aεψ + Aεmψ)




= −2 (2 +m− εψ − εmψ) (aψ − Am− 2A+ Aεψ + Aεmψ)
2
B (2m+ 2n− εψ +mn− εmψ − εnψ − εmnψ + 4)3
< 0
For the numerators:
aψ − Am− 2A+ Aεψ + Aεmψ < 0 always holds based on the positivity conditions of q1i
2 +m − εψ − εmψ > 0 always holds since εψ < 1
For the denominator:
2m+ 2n− εψ +mn− εmψ − εnψ − εmnψ + 4 > 0 always holds since εψ < 1
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D.4 Proof of the effect of competition on the total output
of the cross industry (case III-1)
In the normal case, increasing the number of firms in one industry increases the total output
of the cross industry.
∂Q3,1
∂m
= − ψ (n+ 1) (Aε− 2a− an+ aεψ + aεnψ)
B (2m+ 2n− εψ +mn− εmψ − εnψ − εmnψ + 4)2
> 0
For the numerator:
Aε− 2a− an+ aεψ + aεn < 0 always holds based on the positivity conditions of w1j
For the denominator:
2m+ 2n− εψ +mn− εmψ − εnψ − εmnψ + 4 > 0 always holds since εψ < 1
D.5 Proof of the effect of competition on individual out-
puts and profit of firms in the cross industry (case
III-1)
In the normal case, increasing the number of firms in one industry increases the individual
output of firms in the cross industry.
∂q3,1i
∂m
= − ψ (Aε− 2a− an+ aεψ + aεnψ)





2ψ (aψ − Am− 2A+ Aεψ + Aεmψ) (Aε− 2a− an+ aεψ + aεnψ)




Aε− 2a− an+ aεψ + aεn < 0 always holds based on the positivity conditions of w1j
aψ − Am− 2A+ Aεψ + Aεmψ < 0 always holds based on the positivity conditions of q1j
For the denominators:
2m+ 2n− εψ +mn− εmψ − εnψ − εmnψ + 4 > 0 always holds since εψ < 1
D.6 Proof of the effect of competition on consumer sur-
plus (case III-1)
In the normal case, increasing the number of firms in one industry increases the consumer




(m+ 2) (n+ 1) (aψ − Am− 2A+ Aεψ + Aεmψ)2





ψ (n+ 1)2 (aψ − Am− 2A+ Aεψ + Aεmψ) (Aε− 2a− an+ aεψ + aεnψ)
B (2m+ 2n− εψ +mn− εmψ − εnψ − εmnψ + 4)3
> 0
The first equation is positive, and the second equation is proven positive in Appendix D.5
D.7 Proof of the effect of competition on individual out-
puts of the cross industry (case III-2)
In the case where the power industry buys all water, increasing the number of firms in the
water industry increases the individual output of firms in the power industry if and only if



















D.8 Proof of the effect of competition on individual out-
puts of the same industry (case III-2)
In the case where the power industry buys all water, increasing the number of firms in the
water industry increases the individual output of firms in the water industry if and only if
the reservation price of power is low and the water suppliers are efficient, and the marginal




ψ (Bε− bψ) (a− Aε)
(Bε− 2bψ +Bεm− bmψ)2
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